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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
THE ULTRASOUND FETAL IMAGE: THE EVENT OF BIRTH, 
FEMALE BODY AND MEDICAL DISCOURSE 
 
Ersan Ocak 
Ph.D. in Art, Design and Architecture 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
May, 2008 
 
The use of ultrasound fetal image has become common in medical practice. The 
ultrasound is a contemporary result of a long medical and technological history, in 
which the human body and its pathologies are known and controlled by medical 
apparatus. It is a specific form of image produced by what Michel Foucault called 
the medical gaze. The thesis offers a genealogy of the ultrasound image and then 
turns its attention to its contemporary use. By taking the obstetrical examination 
room as a social context, it shows that what is at stake is not merely technological 
but actually a social relationship, at the center of which visibility plays a fundamental 
role. This new power context controls and administers both women’s body and the 
emergent fetal body, which it perceives as an “originary human form.” In the culture 
at large, the fetus is even turned into a citizen with its rights, a metaphor which the 
anti-abortion movement used and abused extensively. Reading fetology as well as 
the fetal image in terms of a social relationship of power, it is demonstrated that the 
woman’s body is treated as mere environment. However, although technology is an 
important part of this biopolitics, it can also be read as an extension of human body 
through which the body knows and complicates itself.     
 
KEYWORDS: fetus, ultrasound, fetal image, fetal personhood, medical gaze, 
phallomorphism, ocularcentrism, phallogocentrism.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
ULTRASON FETUS İMAJI: DOĞUM OLAYI, KADIN BEDENİ VE 
TIBBİ SÖYLEM 
 
Ersan Ocak 
Sanat, Tasarım ve Mimarlık Doktora Programı 
Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Mayıs, 2008 
 
Ultrason fetus imajı tıbbi pratik içinde yaygın biçimde kullanılmaktadır. Uzun bir 
tıbbi ve teknolojik tarhin çağdaş sonucu olan ultrason sayesinde insan bedeni ve bu 
beden içindeki patolojiler tıp tarafından bilinir ve kontrol edilebilir olmuştur. 
Ultrason imajı Michel Foucault’nun tıbbi bakış dediği şey tarafından üretilen spesifik 
bir imajdır. Bu tezde ultrason imajlarının tarihsel kökeninin bir analizi yapıldıktan 
sonra çağdaş kullanımına yoğunlaşılmıştır. Kadın doğum muayene odası bir sosyal 
bağlam olarak ele alınırken söz konusu olanın yalnızca teknolojik değil esasen 
merkezinde görselliğin temel rol oynadığı bir sosyal ilişki olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bu 
yeni güç bağlamı hem kadınların bedenini hem de “orijinal insan formu” olarak 
algıladığı ve ortaya çıkardığı fetus bedenini kontrol eder ve yönetir. En geniş 
anlamada kültürel olarak, fetus hakları olan bir yurttaşa dönüştürülmüştür. Bu 
metafor kürtaj karşıtları tarafından çok kullanılmış ve bir o kadar da suistimal 
edilmiştir. Fetolojiyi ve fetus imajını gücün sosyal ilişkileri terimleri içinde okumak 
göstermiştir ki kadın bedeni yalnızca fetusun yaşayıp büyüeceği bir çevre olarak ele 
alınmaktadır. Teknoloji bu bio-politkanın önemli bir parçası olsa da ultrason fetus 
imajları bedenin bildiği, ürettiği, kendini karmaşık hale getirdiği ve yine bedenin bir 
uzantısı olan imajlar olarak da okunabilir.  
 
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: fetus, ultrason, fetus imajı, fetus kişilik, tıbbi bakış, 
pahllomorphism, gözmerkezcilik, phallogocentrism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
My aim in this thesis is to re-elaborate the ultrasound fetal image by taking this 
image to the site to which it belongs, i.e. the female body. A number of feminist 
scholars (Barbara Duden, Karen Newman, Rosalind Petchesky, Barbara K. Rothman, 
Carol Stabile) have made discussions on fetus, ultrasound fetal images and their 
relation with the female body. In these discussions, they have emphasized that much 
of the attention is paid to the fetus, fetal image and its symbolic meanings, rather 
than the female body, its sexuality and procreative power. They have reached the 
critical conclusion that, the female body is either reduced to an ecological 
environment for the fetus or totally obliterated. Therefore, the fetus shades the 
female body and becomes not only the object of the medical analyses and popular 
discourse, but also a fetal personhood (Duden, 1993, p. 2; Newman, 1996, p. 67; 
Petchesky, 1987, p. 61; Rothman, 2000, p. 112; Stabile, 1992, p. 180). 
 
In this thesis, the concept of the ultrasound fetal image will be elaborated from the 
point of view of the female body, its sexuality and procreative potential. Therefore, I 
will use a theoretical and methodological framework that concentrates on the body, 
and especially the female body. Before arguing theoretical and methodological 
framework, in order to clarify my research question in this thesis, I will briefly 
discuss some issues circumscribing the ultrasound fetal images as a phenomenon. 
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Since the end of the 19th century, new and different types of techno-scientific 
medical images surround us. Ultrasound fetal images appear as one of them. And, 
like many other techno-scientific medical images, they have always been associated 
with a ‘progressive’ discourse. Van Dijck (2005) explains the unconscious 
mechanism behind this expectation of progress from these medical images and hence 
medical imaging technologies as follows:  
 
Common belief in the progress of medical science relies in part on 
unswerving confidence in the mechanical-medical eye: that better 
imaging instruments automatically lead to more knowledge, resulting in 
more cures. [...] And yet, patients often blindly trust the panoptic nature 
of the mechanical-clinical eye (Van Dijck, 2005, p. 7, emphasis mine). 
 
The progress in medical imaging, and especially in fetal imaging, is questionable for 
the female body from which the fetal images are reproduced by the ultrasound 
apparatus. The ultrasound fetal images have led to ethical, judicial/legislative, 
political, social and cultural consequences that generate a fetal personhood with 
rights, which simultaneously obliterate the female body, its sexuality and procreative 
potential. 
 
Fetal images have always been fascinating for people because of being perceived 
symbolically as ‘the beginning of life,’ ‘the life before birth,’ and even ‘life itself.’ 
And people have encountered this symbolically fascinating image basically in two 
modes: in the obstetrical clinic and in the public space. The scope of this thesis is 
limited to the obstetrical clinical mode.  
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1.1. The Ubiquity Of the Ultrasound Fetal Image 
 
After the invention of still image of photography and moving images of cinema, new 
and different types of images have emerged in our world since the end of the 19th 
century. Here, within these new and different types of images, medical ones (X-ray 
images, ultrasound images, MRI images, CTI images, etc.) have a significant place.1  
 
As one of these medical images, fetal images in general and “ultrasound” fetal 
images in particular, have specific features. Their uses have spilled outside the 
boundaries of the specialized medical scope. They have come on the scene in our 
everyday life. They are now so ubiquitous that, according to Barbara Duden (1993), 
“we are overwhelmed with fetuses” (p. 7). 
 
Ultrasound fetal images are no longer only reproduced in the obstetrical clinic during 
the examination of a pregnant woman. They are no longer only printed and published 
in the obstetrics, cardiology, pediatrics, radiology, or other related medical journals. 
They are now in magazines as a part of an essay, on billboards in the streets as a 
visual component of an advertisement campaign, in the classrooms as visual 
educational material, in the movies as a scene of feature or documentary film2, on 
television in fiction or health programs, even in the baby photo-album as the figure 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the important role of medicine in the invention of photography and cinema has been mostly 
neglected in theoretical and historical studies. For a study that concentrates on the conjunction and 
convergence of medical imaging and cinema, see Lisa Cartwright’s book, Screening the Body (1995). 
2 Since Richard Fleischer’s cult film Fantastic Voyage (1966) medical images in general and fetal 
images in particular have been used in both feature and documentary films. The PBS’s documentary 
The Miracle of Life (1983, directed by Mikael Agaton, photographed by Lennart Nilsson) and later the 
BBC’s documentary series Superhuman (1998, directed by Christopher Spencer) and The Human 
Body (2001, directed by Judith Butling, Liesl Ivans and David Hickman) became extremely popular 
all around the world. While the visual regime of these documentary films is based mainly on medical 
imaging scenes, embryonic and fetal images occupy specific place in them.  
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on the beginning page, called “baby’s first picture.”3 Thus, ultrasound fetal images 
have not only overwhelmed our world, but also have now a growing public and 
medical fascination since their emergence.  
 
1.2. Modes of Encountering the Ultrasound Fetal Image 
 
Although fetal images are ubiquitous, there are basically two modes of encountering 
them. The first one is the obstetrical clinical mode. Today, when a woman thinks she 
might be pregnant, she mostly goes to an obstetrician (or a gynecologist) to become 
sure about her pregnancy. And in the obstetrical clinic the most common method in 
the confirmation of pregnancy has become the ultrasound examination. Therefore, 
today, ultrasound embryonic/fetal examination has become the most common and 
the most popular scientific evidence of pregnancy. 
 
Although there are alternative scientific or practical ways of finding out whether one 
is pregnant or not, such as blood test made in a medical laboratory, or using a test kit 
bought from a pharmacy, only ultrasound examination in the obstetrical clinic can 
provide visual evidence. Hence, ultrasound examination is categorically different 
from other methods in that it produces visible evidence of the presence of an embryo. 
More importantly, this is only the starting point of an obstetrical visual examination 
series throughout the period of pregnancy, which focuses on the further development 
of the embryo into the fetus.   
 
                                                 
3 Petchesky (1987) says, “At least one-third of all pregnant women in the United States are now 
exposed to ultrasound imaging, and that would seem to be a growing figure. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many if not most pregnancies will soon include ultrasound scans and presentation of a 
sonogram photo ‘for the baby album’” (p. 66). 
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The pregnant woman undergoes a routine examination almost each month in her 
prenatal (also called antenatal) period. In prenatal examinations, a series of 
ultrasound examinations are made mainly for the surveillance and control of the 
development of the embryo/fetus.4 Hence, I call these ultrasound embryonic/fetal 
examinations as the clinical mode of encountering the fetal image. Its most important 
characteristic is that the fetus is regarded as belonging to the woman (Fig. 1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1. Ultrasound embryonic/fetal examination (Nilsson, 1990, p. 104). 
 
 
 
The second mode of encounter is public. Anyone has seen, or can see an 
“anonymous” ultrasound fetal image any time in a magazine, on a billboard or on 
television. A remarkable example of the public display of an ultrasound fetal image 
appeared in Ankara in 2003. The Medical Faculty at Gazi University made a 
corporate-image campaign at its 25th anniversary, in which posters on billboards and 
                                                 
4 The number of the ultrasound examinations during the prenatal period changes from country to 
country mainly according to health system and regualtions of obstetrical examination of each country. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that, in Turkey, especially in the private obstetrical clinics, the ultrasound 
fetal examination is almost done at every routine prenatal examination. 
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brochures were used. The dominant visual element in the posters and brochures was 
a fetal image. This campaign continued with an emphasis on high-end apparatuses of 
medical imaging technology that the university owns (Fig. 1.2).  
 
 
 
   
 
Fig. 1.2. The corporate-image campaign brochure of the Gazi University, Hospital of 
Medical Faculty, 2003. 
 
 
 
This thesis concentrates on the obstetrical clinical image. Public image of the fetus 
will be involved to the extent that it has an impact on the clinical one.  
 
1.3. Fascination with the Ultrasound Fetal Image 
 
Ultrasound fetal image is not just any kind of techno-scientific image; it has always 
been symbolically more than that. It is perceived by people, symbolically, as ‘the 
beginning of life,’ ‘the life before birth,’ and even ‘life itself.’ In this sense, 
ultrasound fetal images have not only been distinct from other medical images, but 
they have also spilled out the boundaries of medical institution. They have become 
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fascinating for people, and hence had impact on the public imaginary. Ultrasound 
fetal images have also been fascinating for medical circles, especially for obstetrics, 
with its capacity to put under surveillance, to control and to govern the fetus as well 
as the womb, the female body and its procreative potential. Therefore, “fetal 
fascinations” (Franklin, 1991) have come out in two different forms: the public fetal 
fascination and the medical/obstetrical fetal fascination. 
 
First of all, we should understand the technological fascination that establishes the 
basis for the other forms of fascination. The common ultimate aim of medical 
imaging technologies is to make the body transparent and hence make the invisible 
visible. In the obstetrical imaging of the womb and the fetus, ultrasound reproduces 
moving images in real time without penetrating into the body of the pregnant 
woman.5 In other words, the ultrasound image has a powerful sense of immediacy 
and obstetrical ultrasound operates like a ‘womb television’; the movements of both 
the womb and the fetus are watched and witnessed by the obstetrician, the pregnant 
woman and her partner as the spectators in the obstetrical clinic. Here, the fetus 
mostly comes to fore in the screen and covers it as the dominant spectacular element 
for all spectators. Hence, the fascinating nature of the ultrasound fetal image is based 
on its immediacy as well as its moving character.  
 
Ultrasound fetal images become fascinating for the obstetricians for it enables them 
put the fetus and the woman’s body under surveillance and control in the prenatal 
period, and this is accompanied by emerging diagnostic techniques parallel to the 
development of the ultrasound apparatus. Consequently, obstetrics as a medical 
                                                 
5 Indeed, high frequency sound waves penetrate into the female body and the echoes of the tissues are 
recollected. Although there is a penetration, it does not occur in physical sense. The possibble harmful 
effects of the penetration of high frequency sound waves is still an issue of debate and inquiry. 
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discipline extends its power on the government of the female body and its 
procreative potential. This phenomenon must be called the “obstetricization of the 
female body.” Hence, the obstetrical fetal fascination comes out with the 
development of new analysis techniques on the ultrasound fetal images. These 
techniques have even led to the emergence of a new sub-discipline in obstetrics that 
is called “fetology.” The overall impact of this development is turning the female 
body into an ecological environment for the fetus.  
 
I have already indicated, how, with the common use of ultrasound in obstetrics, fetal 
images have gained symbolic meanings and spilled out the boundaries of the 
obstetrical clinic. Today, these images ubiquitously surround everyday life and come 
to signify an “originary human form” conceived as ‘the beginning of life,’ ‘the life 
before birth,’ and even ‘life itself.’ A pregnant woman’s body has conventionally 
been under some kind of “public scrutiny.”6 But, with the emergence of the fetal 
image, the pregnant body itself is often seen as a displacement for the fetal image, 
hence one that calls for it. The use of these images in abortion debate, especially in 
the USA, as the images of a little human facilitates a perception of the fetus as a 
person endowed with rights. The well-known video The Silent Scream signifies the 
summit of the public fascination of ultrasound fetal images in conservative anti-
abortionist discourse by introducing the abortion as the killing of a little human. This 
conservative public fascination stems from a particular religious argument: “anti-
abortion argument that ‘life begins at conception’ once referred to the idea that all 
                                                 
6 Robyn Longhurst (1999) aims to put in her article “Pregnant Bodies, Public Scrutiny: ‘Giving 
Advice to Pregnant Women,” how the female body is under public scrutiny during pregnancy. She 
explains this phenomenon by exposing how pregnant women mostly receive an enormous amount of 
advice “on topics such as diet, exercise, birth, medical procedures, lactation, how to care for a new-
born baby and how to raise a child” not only from different actors in her social environment such as 
“health workers, friends, acquaintances, loved ones, colleagues, and even strangers” but also from 
different sources “including pamphlets, manuals, books, newspapers, magazines, and advertisements” 
(Longhurst, 1999, p. 78).  
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human life is sacred because it was created by God, and thus for a divine purpose” 
(Franklin, 1991, p. 191). 
 
1.4. A Methodological Search: Elaborating the Concept of the Ultrasound Fetal 
Image 
 
Especially after the invention of photography, with its ‘reality’ effect, people have 
always been inclined to perceive images in an illusion that the image has taken the 
place of the thing itself. In other words, the thing and the representation of that thing 
have always been confused.7 Therefore, representation has always been a major issue 
in the analysis of images.  
 
In the history of the development of medical images, the problem of representation 
has come out in a different way. While photographic imaging technology operates to 
represent the thing in the world, which is seen, medical imaging technology is 
established on the motivation of making the body transparent and representing the 
thing which is unseen. Hence, when people encounter the medical image, they have 
to learn to see it for representational schema to work. Medical images have always 
been fascinating for people because they represent the unseen world of their bodies 
and have powerful symbolic meanings about life. Then, it is essential to elaborate 
how the representational schema operates for the ultrasound fetal image.  
 
                                                 
7 The translator of Michel Foucault’s book This is not a Pipe, James Harkness (1983) explains this 
confusion very well in his inroductory article: “When we say one thing resembles another, after all, 
we imply that the latter is somehow ontologically superior to, more “real” than the former—the copy 
predicates its existence (qua copy) upon whatever it submissively imitates” (pp. 7-8). 
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There are two main problems, which determine the methodological framework in my 
thesis. First of all, ultrasound fetal images have been mostly discussed within the 
conventions of representational analysis of the seen world. Of course, fetus becomes 
visible with its representation by ultrasound techniques, but it should not be forgotten 
that it belongs to an unseen world. In more clear terms, there should be a difference 
between the representational relation of a visible thing with its image and the 
representational relation of an invisible fetus that is made visible with its fetal image. 
Then, in this thesis I have to elaborate critically not only the technological 
reproduction of the ultrasound fetal images but the representational relation of the 
invisible fetus and the ultrasound fetal image as well. 
 
Secondly, the ultrasound fetal image should be elaborated more than being a medical 
techno-scientific image. It should not be forgotten that ultrasound fetal image 
belongs to the female body, not only in the sense that it is part of its interiority, but 
also it is an effect of its procreative potential. Thus, the female body should be 
brought back to the analysis of ultrasound fetal images, rather than being solely a 
womb/cave/cavity in which the fetus grows. 
 
As I discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, ultrasound fetal images are 
ubiquitous and we encounter them not only in the obstetrical clinic but also at 
different media in our everyday life. But the scope of this thesis is limited to the 
obstetrical clinic. Then, what is needed here is a critical theoretical and 
methodological framework that focuses on the body and its medical representation, 
involving the medical technology. Such a critical framework should reveal how the 
representational schema of medicine is constituted and how it constitutes female 
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body and the fetus. At this point, Michel Foucault’s archeology of the clinical gaze 
may help us. In reading Foucault’s archeology of modern medicine, I will also keep 
in mind his later elaborations on the concept of power-knowledge. I will especially 
use his concept of bio-power that exposes the discourses and practices on the 
normalization and government of the body. My purpose is to focus on the 
representational schema of the ultrasound fetal image as it operates in the obstetrical 
clinic in order to normalize and govern the female body and the fetus.  
 
However I would also like to argue that Foucault’s theoretical framework is still 
insufficient to bring the female body back into the representational schema of 
ultrasound fetal images. For this reason, Luce Irigaray’s feminist deconstruction of 
the “phallogocularcentric” structure of Western thought may help us to take the 
ultrasound fetal images to the site to which it belongs, i.e. the female body, 
especially in her well-known work The Speculum of the Other Woman. In her unique 
style of writing, Irigaray produces a “vulvomorphic” logic against the phallomorphic 
logic of the constitutive texts of classical Western thought.  
 
Martin Jay produces the term “phallogocularcentric” while explaining the specific 
position of Luce Irigaray in French feminist critique. According to Jay (1994), Luce 
Irigaray is the most notable French philosopher, who goes beyond “the mutual 
implication of phallocentrism and ocularcentrism (...) with their complicated debt to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, and acknowledge the “seminal” role of Derrida’s critique 
of logocentrism” (p. 493). Hence, the aim of Irigaray can be stated as “thwarting the 
totalizing effects of” phallocentrism, logocentrism, and ocularcentrism, “what might 
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be called, in the spirit of deconstructionist neologizing, “phallogocularcentrism”” 
(Jay, 1994, p. 494). 
 
In the following chapter, I will present a brief history of ultrasound fetal images 
through the development of medical imaging technologies in order to understand the 
obstetrical clinical encounter. In this historical study, I will also discuss the 
construction and representation of the female body. I will further demonstrate how 
the ultrasound fetal image is distinct from other fetal images. I will now go through 
these points in details. 
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2. THE HISTORY OF ULTRASOUND FETAL IMAGE AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FEMALE BODY 
 
 
 
 
Fetal images have a long history before the emergence of modern medical imaging 
technologies such as X-ray and ultrasound. The first examples of fetal images were, 
on the one hand, the illustrations of a creature of God based on theological 
knowledge or religious beliefs. On the other hand, women were reproducing 
imaginary narratives on their own bodies and hence their own fetal visions.8 
 
According to Barbara Duden (1993), the history of the female body has two stories. 
The first one is the story of the visible: “The story of what can be seen by physicians, 
artists, and women themselves. It deals with woman as her flesh and being is, or can 
be, exposed to the gaze” (Duden, 1993, p. 8). The other story is the story of the 
invisible: “The story of touch and vision, which grope in the darkness beneath the 
skin” (Duden, 1993, p. 8). The fetus and fetal image are part of the second story, 
which have been enforced to become a part of the first story by modern medicine and 
obstetrics.  
 
With the Enlightenment, modern medicine removed from the bellies and minds of 
women any reality that is not perceived by the eye (Duden, 1993, p. 8). Then the 
imaginative narratives of women about their bodies and the fetus were forgotten. 
                                                 
8 Barbara Duden (1991), in her book The Woman Beneath the Skin: A Doctor’s Patients in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany, historically elaborates the pre-modern imaginary narratives of women 
on their bodies. 
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Instead, medical imaging technologies were developed in order to generate the 
singular discourse of the modern medicine that is constructed on the visible, i.e. 
medical gaze. Since then, one of the ultimate goals of modern medicine has been to 
make the invisible visible. Obstetrics, as a specialized sub-discipline of modern 
medicine, strove to penetrate into the female body to see the fetus and thus 
established its medical hegemony on the reproductive power of the female body. 
This has been the generating force of the development of medical imaging 
technologies in the obstetrics. 
 
The genealogy of fetal images openly shows that, “the human fetus, as 
conceptualized today, is not a creature of God or a natural fact, but an engineered 
construct of modern society,” which is particularly an obstetrical construction of 
modern medicine, and which operates by the obstetricization of the female body 
(Duden, 1993, p. 4). Therefore, I will make a genealogical analysis of the fetal 
images starting from the obstetrical and anatomical illustrations and models. This 
history then goes through X-ray fetal images, fetal photography and ends up in the 
ultrasound fetal images. 
 
2.1. Obstetrical Illustrations and Models 
 
“Until the late seventeenth century, the visual codes for representing obstetrical 
knowledge were remarkably constant” (Newman, 1996, p. 26). In the first obstetrical 
images, the uterus is diagrammatically rendered in the shape of “a jar” (Fig. 2.1) 
alternatively with earlike branches or horns, “an urn,” (Fig. 2.2) or, anachronistically, 
“a light bulb” (Fig. 2.3).  The fetus in this diagrammatic borderline was a 
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“homunculus,”9 a miniature man, who is represented in “fantastic gymnastic 
postures” or in balanced poses like an adult sitting, lying, standing or like a child 
“jumping, dancing, diving or tumbling” (Newman, 1996, p. 27). The connection 
between the fetus and the female body is not represented in these images, such as the 
umbilical cord, the placenta, and the uterine layering (Adams, 1994, p. 128). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1.From Musico, 13th century (Newman, 1996, p. 27). 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Homunculus is a supposed microscopic but fully formed human being from which a fetus was 
formerly believed to develop. 
 16 
   
 
Fig. 2.2. From Musico, 9th century  Fig. 2.3. From Eucharius Rösslin, 
(Newman, 1996, p. 28).    The Birth of Man kinde; Otherwise 
      Named the Woman’s Bookie 
      (Newman, 1996, p. 29). 
 
 
 
During the seventeenth century, obstetrical and embryological knowledge became 
more complex. The details such as umbilical cords (Fig. 2.4), uterine layering, 
ovaries (Fig. 2.5), placental tissue (Fig. 2.6) and pelvic bone mass (Fig. 2.7) were 
added to the representation of fetal images in the midwifery manuals. Nevertheless, 
the basic schema in the representations of the fetus and the female body did not 
change until the end of this century. In this basic schema, the fetus is the dominant 
figure, which is fully formed and is always represented as male. It was “actively 
negotiating the uterine environment and cut off from a female body” (Newman, 
1996, p. 33). The female body is not represented, but only the disembodied womb 
appears as a fragmented representation of it. Hence, the female body is reduced to a 
‘vessel,’ which could only be a passive receptacle for the fetus.  
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Fig. 2.4. From Scipione (Girolamo) Mercurio,  
La comare o riccoglitrice, 1618 (Newman, 1996, p. 30). 
 
    
Fig. 2.5. From Jacob Rueff, Fabricus,  Fig. 2.6. From Hieronymus The Expert 
De formato foetu, 1627 (Newman,  Midwife, 1637 (Newman, 1996, p. 31). 
1996, p.  32). 
 
 
Fig. 2.7. From Hendrik van Deventer, Operations novum lumen exhibentes 
obstetricantibus, 1701 (Newman, 1996, p. 32). 
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Newman (1996) interprets the increase of details in the obstetrical renderings of 
uterus and fetus in this period from a different point of view and says that,  
 
In the course of the seventeenth century, details are added to the core 
schema of uterus-fetus—first to the uterus, but increasingly from the 
mid-seventeenth century on to the fetus, which is endowed with 
seemingly “gratuitous” detail that exceeds the instrumental function of 
the obstetrical image. The addition of seemingly innocent minutiae in 
fetal representation works to render the fetus as “lifelike” and “human,” 
an autonomous individual (p. 44). 
 
Starting from the late seventeenth century and mainly in the eighteenth century, 
three-dimensional obstetrical uterus and fetus models, which are made of wax, clay, 
wood, or other materials, are added to the illustrations in obstetrical atlases and 
midwifery manuals. These models were mainly used for pedagogic purposes, parallel 
to the development of “scientific midwifery” and “professionalization of 
obstetrics”10 (Figs. 2.8, 2.9, 2.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.8. Pregnant uterus at monthly stages, 1740s (Newman, 1996, p. 52). 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 “Although the regulation of midwifery in Europe dates from the late 1400s, by the mid-eighteenth 
century women began to be required to have some formal training, lasting anywhere from a few 
months to two years, in schools associated with either a university or a hospital. [...] As obstetrics 
became increasingly technologized with the invention and manufacture of forceps and ever more 
elaborate pelvimeters and specula, and as an accompanying increasingly positivistic view of anatomy 
produced the body as a series of parts to be manipulated, obstetrics became professionalized and, 
ultimately, the province of man, especially among urban elites” (Newman, 1996, p. 51).  
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 Fig. 2.9. Pregnant uterus at seven months Fig.2.10. Removal of the afterbirth, 
 in opened torso, 1740s (Newman, 1996,  1740s (Newman, 1996, p. 54). 
 p. 53). 
 
 
 
   
 
 Fig. 2.11. Difficult presentation, 1740s  Fig. 2.12. Fetal presentation, 1740s 
(Newman, 1996, p. 56).    (Newman, 1996, p.  63). 
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In these models, while the fetuses “look like babies two, even three months old—
plump, hirsute, with filled-out cheeks, in peaceful slumber,” (Figs. 2.11, 2.12) the 
uterus, with a few exceptions, is disembodied from the female body, and stands by 
itself like a vessel laid on a cushion with utmost care (Newman, 1996, p. 62). The 
only difference of these obstetrical models from the earlier obstetrical images is their 
construction of gestation and birth startlingly naturalistically.  
 
2.2. Anatomical Illustrations and Models 
 
Anatomical illustrations and models differ from the early obstetrical images and 
(uterus/fetus) models from the very beginning. Unlike the early obstetrical images 
and models, they frequently represent the full female body or torso. However, the 
male body constitutes the norm in anatomical representations.11 Therefore, although 
the female body or torso is represented as a whole in anatomical illustrations and 
models, this is done either so rarely or only by illustrating anatomical organs 
different from the male body, which are genital and reproductive organs. And even 
sometimes, no female body is represented, but solely the anatomical representations 
of the genital and reproductive organs. Newman (1996) gives a noteworthy example 
as follows:  
 
Even in that great eighteenth-century tribute to rationalism, the 
Encyclopédie, among 33 plates that illustrate the article “Anatomie,” no 
female body is represented. Female anatomy is represented on a single 
page containing an illustration of the uterus; another illustration of the 
                                                 
11 This is relevant for the contemporary anatomy discipline. “For example, contemporary anatomy 
textbooks designed for medical students still tend to portray the male body as the standard human 
body, against which the ‘different’ female body is compared. Illustrations in current medical 
textbooks routinely use male bodies to portray specific features shared by the sexes, making it 
impossible to learn female anatomy without first learning male anatomy, while comparative 
references to female anatomy make constant use of the terms ‘smaller’, ‘feebler’, ‘weaker’ or ‘less 
developed’ to demonstrate how women differ from men” (Lupton, 1995, p. 132). 
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placenta with a fetus standing independently alongside, the umbilical 
cord reaching not directly to its opened torso but, oddly, behind the head 
and over the shoulder; and three details of the vulva that focus on the 
clitoris” (p. 69) (Fig. 2.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.13. “Anatomie,” plate XXII,  
L’Encyclopédie, 1762 (Newman, 1996, p. 70). 
 
 
 
While the female body is not fully represented in the Encyclopédie, in most of the 
anatomical illustrations and models the female body is fully illustrated or carved. But 
it is significant that the wholeness of the female body mostly appears as nude rather 
than an anatomical illustration or model. Only partially the reproductive organs are 
anatomically represented. Newman (1996) states that, “female anatomy, it seems, 
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can only be represented synecdochically in its sexual/reproductive specificity” (p. 
69). Hence, the female torso is mostly slit enough to present the reproductive organs, 
which are different from the norm of male anatomy. The uterus always includes a 
fetus, represented as a fully formed tiny adult, a homunculus.  
 
In anatomical illustrations and models, “the scientific information of anatomy is 
rendered via the canons of conventional artistic representation” (Newman, 1996, p. 
69). These artistic illustrations are gendered and represent the female body “as a 
classical nude (Fig. 2.14), as a courtesan (Fig. 2.15), as a venus pudica (Fig. 2.16), or 
as Eve before the fall (Fig. 2.17)” (Newman, 1996, p. 69) with “mythological, 
biblical, classic humanist and anthropological (woman as nature/flower)” narratives 
of gender (Newman, 1996, p. 82). 
 
 
 
   
 
Fig. 2.14. From Petro Berrettini,   Fig. 2.15. From Cosmo Viardel,  
Tabula anatomicae, 1741 (Newman,  Observations sur la pratique des 
1996, p. 73).     acouchemens, 1673 (Newman, 1996, p. 74). 
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Fig. 2.16. From Scipione (Girolamo)  Fig. 2.17. From Jourdain Guibelet,  
Mercurio, La comare o riccoglitrice,  Trois discours philosophiques,  
1601 (Newman, 1996, p. 77).   1603 (Newman, 1996, p. 79). 
 
 
 
In the history of obstetrics, William Hunter’s obstetrical atlas takes a significant step 
with its specialization on the anatomy of the uterus. In 1772, William Hunter 
published this atlas, called Anatomy of the Human Gravid Uterus. In this atlas, only 
the female torso is represented in an ‘amputated’ form (Figs. 2.18, 2.19).12 Indeed, it 
is still consistent with the synecdochical representation of the female body in its 
reproductive specificity, which establishes the essence of the anatomical convention.  
 
Hunter’s Anatomy of the Human Gravid Uterus marks the beginning of a significant 
shift in the representation of the uterus and the fetus. “Hunter viewed the change 
aesthetically as a progression from “a figure of fancy,” or an imaginative rendering 
                                                 
12 It is remarkable that while the amputated legs are closed with a piece of fabric in Fig. 19, the female 
body has been amputated “not only visually and narratively, but literaly” in Fig. 20 (Adams, 1994, p. 
131). Especially the latter image involves a violence on the female body. For a detailed discussion on 
the violence on the female body in epistemological, actual, and representational senses, see 
Jordanova, Sexual Visions (pp. 60-62). 
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Fig. 2.18. Nine month uterus, William Hunter’s Human Gravid Uterus, 1779 (Adams, 1994, 
p. 133). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.19. Fetus in utero, William Hunter’s Human Gravid Uterus, 1779 (Adams, 1994, p. 
134). 
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that merely describes the object, to a truthful depiction of an actual body that would 
convey its own truth, hardly needing textual interpretation” (Adams, 1994, p. 128). 
Nevertheless, when we look at the representation of the fetuses in Hunter’s book, it is 
obvious that, “a creative, rather than a revelatory gaze is at work” (Adams, 1994, p. 
129).  
 
According to Newman (1996), “not until the late eighteenth century are there 
representations of a woman’s fully pregnant body outside such coded narratives” (p. 
82) (Fig. 2.20). In this illustration (Fig. 2.20), besides the representation of a  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.20. From J. B. Jacobs, Ecole pratique des accouchemens, 1793 (Newman, 1996. p 85). 
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woman’s fully pregnant body, the representations of both the uterus and fetus show a 
radical difference from other conventional anatomical illustrations. One of the most 
significant differences of this illustration is its realistic representation of the fetus 
with unformed features and limbs rather than a homunculus, a miniature man. 
Newman (1996) adds that “the uterus and placenta are rendered with more detail and 
are sized proportionately” (p. 82).  
 
The eighteenth century was also the beginning of the age of great anatomical wax 
collections. Although the primary use of these models was medical training, they 
also enjoyed a wide circulation such as in art academies, in public exhibitions of 
various kinds, and in private collections (Jordanova, 1989, p. 49). Without making 
any difference, wherever they were used, anatomical wax models of the female body 
have always been recumbent and supine women,13 called “anatomical Venuses,” 
(Newman, 1996. p. 86) “lie on silk or velvet cushions, in passive, yet sexually 
inviting poses” (Jordanova, 1989, p. 44) (Fig. 2.21). Thus, different from the 
mythological, biblical, or anthropological narrative codes of anatomical illustrations  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.21. Anatomical model, 18th century (Newman, 1996, p. 87). 
 
                                                 
13 Jordanova (1989) claims that, “Yet, I know of no male models which show the complete body 
either covered with flesh or recumbent” (p. 44). 
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Fig. 2.22. Anatomical model,  Fig. 2.23. Wax model “Lo Spellato,” La  
18th century (Newman, 1996. p. 87). Specola, Florence, Italy (Van Dijck, 2005, p. 50). 
 
 
 
of the female body, “they are inserted in a different semantic chain as odalisques” 
(Newman, 1996, p. 86). They are adorned with flowing hair, bedecked with pearl 
necklaces, with faces in almost sensual abandon (Figs. 2.22, 2.23). 
 
These anatomical models are always pregnant. So the ultimate aim is to reveal the 
fetus in depth after removing each tissue and organ through these anatomical models 
of the female body. This fetus in depth has always been a homunculus and it has 
never been subject to a dissection. It should be noted that, although the 
representation of the fetus and the female body became more realistic in anatomical 
illustrations at the end of the eighteenth century (as mentioned above and shown in 
Fig. 2.20), the model of the fetus in wax models stayed as a homunculus, a tiny adult, 
a miniature man. 
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In sum, the fetus is always represented as male and independent of the female body 
in obstetrical illustrations and models in midwifery manuals, obstetrical anatomy 
atlases, and medical dictionaries. The fetal image is never subject to a virtual 
dissection and is always illustrated and modeled as whole and undivided. Therefore, 
fetal image was “the image par excellence of rights-bearing Enlightenment Man,” 
from the beginning and, in a sense, has become a fetal personhood since then 
(Newman, 1996, p. 67).  
 
The female body is always represented in a lacking form and “sacrificed to fetal 
subjectivity in multiple ways” (Newman, 1996, p. 88). In the midwifery manuals, a 
full and proper representation of the female body is lacking; what we find is always a 
representation of a fragment, i.e. the womb. In anatomical illustrations and models, 
although the female body is represented as a whole, it is, on the one hand, figured in 
explicitly sexualized poses and on the other, it is dissected, opened, and its inside and 
the fetus it carries are made visible.  
 
In contemporary editions of obstetrical textbooks, mostly the photographic images 
are used for the prenatal care or well-being, referred to as “prenatal surveillance,” 
rather than any illustrative representation of the female body and the fetus (Newman, 
1996, p. 104). The exceptional drawings and models of the female body or the fetus 
still adhere to the hegemonic conventions analyzed above. 
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2.3. X-Ray Fetal Image 
 
With the invention of X-ray at the end of the nineteenth century, not only a new 
medical imaging technology emerged but a new mode of seeing and representation 
of the body came out as well. Before X-ray, the photography camera was already 
invented and it had not only become popular with the public but also “by the 1890s 
photographs had become the standard recorders of objective scientific truth” (Kevles, 
1997, p. 15). Just before the invention of X-ray, the first motion picture shows had 
been made in cabarets. As Kevles (1997) states, “on the eve of the discovery of X-
rays, everything was in place: the cameras were loaded, the projection booth ready to 
go. But no one was prepared for a device that would change the face of the medicine, 
law, the arts, and the way ordinary people perceived their own bodies” (p. 16). 
Therefore, the year 1895, which is officially accepted date of the invention of X-ray 
technology, symbolizes the paradigmatic shift “in accepting the body as porous 
beyond the ordinary vision” (Kevles, 1997, p. 288).  
 
With the use of X-ray in medicine as a medical imaging technology, a frontier is 
passed: The opaque body is made transparent, or in other terms, medical imaging 
technology made the invisible visible without physically penetrating into the body. 
This was at the same time a new mode of seeing, i.e. a new representation of the 
inside of the body. It was not operating as the anatomists see inside the body with 
their eyes. X-ray films were reproducing gray scale shadows of the inside of the 
body and hence physicians have learnt to read these images in medical sense. 
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After Wilhelm Röntgen invented the X-ray in 1895, it reached the fetus in a very 
short time. As Duden (1993) tells, 
 
A woman’s belly was exposed to invisible electromagnetic waves, and 
the shadows thrown lit up a barium-covered screen. The outlines of a tiny 
cranium and shortly afterward that of some tender bones were captured 
on the photographic plate. The six-month embryo was first seen as a 
tentative skeleton. In the 1930s, biomedical methods certified its 
presence even before the midpoint of pregnancy. In the 1940s, at the cost 
of a couple of guinea pigs for each test, scientific verification became 
even more reliable (Duden, 1993, p. 32). 
 
This invention also signified the beginning of another phase of the project of 
‘making the female body transparent,’ for the sake of seeing the fetus in the womb 
and reproducing the fetal image without having to cut the female body open or 
physically penetrate into it (Fig. 2.24). But, later, the harmful effects of X-ray on  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.24. X-rayed fetuses (Oakley, 1986, p.101). 
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both the fetus and the pregnant woman were scientifically proved. However, 
coincidentally the technology of ultrasound was at the phase of research and 
development, and it would spontaneously take the role of X-ray technology as the 
vision of the inside.  
 
2.4. Fetal Photography: Lennart Nilsson 
 
Lennart Nilsson, the Swedish photographer,14 took the first fetal photographs by 
working seven years on his project. Nilsson’s fetal photographs first appeared in the 
cover page of the Life magazine in 1965 (Fig. 2.25), with an article entitled “Drama 
of Life Before Birth” (Fig. 2.26). These photographs were the first realistic images of 
the fetus in the hitherto impenetrable womb. 1960s was a transitional period for 
medical imaging. X-rays were no more used because of their scientifically proved 
harmful effects. It was the early development period of ultrasonography so 
ultrasound fetal images had not yet appeared on the cultural scene. Therefore, fetal 
photography was met with great fascination (Stabile, 1992, p. 185). In a short time, 
they were used by anti-abortionist movement, as proof of the beginning of life at 
fetal stage. They also became “the locus classicus for feminist discussions of fetal 
imagery” (Newman, 1996, p. 10).  
 
According to Duden (1993), Nilsson “conceived of himself as a descendant of the 
copper engraver, who in the sixteenth century had made illustration possible, and the 
wood engraver or lithographer who in the nineteenth century had made it cheap and 
 
                                                 
14 The nationality of Nilsson is important because in 1960s Sweden was the country, “where many 
privileged American women of sufficient means obtained abortion” (Newman, 1996, p. 13). And 
Nilsson worked in cooperation with abortion doctors for his fetal photography project in his country. 
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Fig. 2.25. Fetus at eighteen weeks, cover page of Life,  
April 30, 1965 (Michaels, 1999, p. 118). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.26. Fetus at fifteen weeks, Life, April 30, 1965 (Newman, 1996, p. 11). 
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therefore popular” (p.12). Besides reproducing fetal photographs and making them 
popular, Nilsson can also be considered as a descendant of William Hunter and other 
obstetrical anatomists in his 1965 fetal photographs. As the fiber optics technology 
for fetoscopy was still at an early stage of development, fetal photographs in situ 
were less in number. Most of the fetal photographs were reproduced in laboratory by 
utilizing fetus corpses, which had been surgically removed for a variety of medical 
reasons. Therefore, most of Nilsson’s 1965 fetal photographs were still-life 
photographs of the fetus like Hunter’s dissection and illustration of the cadavers of 
pregnant woman and fetus. In other words, they both pictured dead bodies.   
 
Later, a series of fetal photographs, which were depicting the development of fetus 
were reproduced by Nilsson and published again by Life magazine in 1990.  Once 
again, one of Nillson’s fetal photographs was occupying the cover page of Life 
magazine, this time with the caption “The First Pictures Ever of How Life Begins” 
(Fig. 2.27). Nilsson’s fetal development photograph series were also published as a 
book named A Child is Born in the same year (Fig. 2.28). 
 
With his 1990 fetal development series Nilsson broke the lineage with fetal 
illustration of Hunter and other obstetrical anatomists, and brought out a 
representational shift. “The living body of the fetus, freed from the obscurity of its 
life in the womb, should outshine the archaic corpse and reveal its truths 
unambiguously to the curious gaze” (Adams, 1994, p. 140). These new fetal 
photographs, which were reproduced with advanced apparatuses and technical skills 
in medical and surgical processes, also passed a frontier between the representations  
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Fig. 2.27. Life magazine cover page,  
August 1990 (Michaels, 1999, p. 121). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.28. Cover page of Nilsson’s book A Child is Born. 
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of visible and invisible. Duden (1993) expresses that as the disappearance of “the 
frontier between visible things that are visibly re-presented and invisible things to 
which representation imputes visibility” (p.16).  
 
In the 1965 fetal photographs of Nilsson, the reader could easily recognize the 
images while reading the corresponding text, as illustrations of an extended caption. 
In the 1990 fetal photograph series, “the illustrative function of the pictures has been 
inverted. (…) Without instructions from the writer, one cannot read anything into 
these shapes” (Duden, 1993, p. 12). (Figs. 2.29, 2.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.29. Four weeks embryo (Nilsson, 1990, p. 79). 
 
 36 
 
 
Fig. 2.30. Six weeks after fertilization (Nilsson, 1990, p. 85). 
 
 
 
The main intention in fetal photographs of Nilsson (especially in 1990 series) is to 
show the development of fetus. It becomes more humanlike in its bubble at every 
week and month passing. (Figs. 2.31, 2.32, 2.33) At the beginning, while it is a 
specimen, towards the end of gestation the text presents it as “an astronaut,” i.e. an 
individual/subject (Fig. 2.34). Adams (1994) states that “the only consistent “truth” 
that these photographs seem to tell is that the fetus, whether a corpse or a living 
organism, is essentially an independent individual” (p. 143). In all fetal photographs 
of Nilsson, there is one thing lacking as a black void surrounding the spaceship of the 
astronaut fetus: the body of the pregnant woman. These photographs only carry some 
traces of the amniotic sac and placenta at different levels. Therefore, the female body 
is obliterated. 
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Fig. 2.31. Embryo approximately Fig. 2.32. Eight weeks old embryo/fetus  
six-weeks-old (Nilsson, 1990, p. 89) (Nilsson, 1990, p. 91). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.33. Eighteen weeks old fetus (Nilsson, 1990, p. 138). 
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Fig. 2.34. Three-month-old fetus (Nilsson, 1990, p. 106). 
 
 
 
2.5. Ultrasound Fetal Image 
 
In the 1960s, ultrasound technology started to be used in obstetrics as an extension of 
military sonar technology. And with the use of ultrasound in obstetrics, a new era is 
opened in the obstetrics discipline and medical imaging in obstetrics. 15 Indeed, this 
is the second stage of the breakthrough in making the female body transparent, which 
was started by X-ray technology. The use of ultrasound expanded in a very short 
time both by the supply of ultrasound apparatuses in obstetrical clinics and by the 
demand of the people to see the ultrasound fetal image; pregnant woman and her 
                                                 
15 For a more general history of the development of ultrasound see Edward Yoxen’s article, “Seeing 
with Sound: A Study of the Development of Medical Images,” Kevles’ book Naked to the Bone, and 
Ann Oakley’s article, “A History Lesson: Ultrasound in Obstetrics” in her book Women, Medicine 
and Health. Also see Woo’s online article “A Short History of the Development of Ultrasound in 
Obstetrics and Gynecology.” 
“Mankind is a newcomer to the 
universe, and this 3-month-old 
fetus may be seen as a symbol of 
our advent—a space traveler in his 
capsule, complete with lifeline. 
The ragged halo is the chorionic 
sac, which adheres to the placenta” 
(Nilsson 107). 
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partner have always been in deep curiosity and impatience to see ‘their unborn baby’. 
On the cultural scene, this can even be termed as “ultrasound mania”, following Lisa 
Cartwright (1995) who called the vociferous response and demand to X-ray imaging 
technology “X-ray mania” (p.107).  
 
Ultrasound fetal image “appeared as an echo outline of an inaudible “sound”” 
(Duden, 1993, p. 32). When we look at the technical reproduction of ultrasound fetal 
images, there are basically three phases. In the first phase, an inaudible sound wave 
is produced by a transducer16 encased in the probe of the ultrasound machine and 
sent into the womb through the abdominal surface (called “abdominal ultrasound 
examination”) or through the vagina of the pregnant woman (called “transvaginal 
ultrasound examination”). This inaudible sound wave is a single focused arch-shaped 
form like it is seen on the monitor of the ultrasound machine. It is the sum of all the 
individual pulses emitted by the transducer that is between determined frequency 
ranges.  
 
Whenever this inaudible sound wave is sent to the pregnant woman’s body, the 
second phase immediately begins: the woman’s body returns sound as an echo. The 
sound wave penetrating into the body is reflected with different intensities with 
respect to the density of the tissues of the womb and the fetus. Finally, in the second 
phase, these echoes vibrate the transducer’s elements in the probe and are converted 
into electrical pulses.  
 
                                                 
16 A transducer is an electronic device for converting energy from one form to another. Microphones, 
loudspeakers, thermometers, position and pressure sensors, and even common light bulbs are 
examples of transducers in our daily life. 
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In the third phase, the electrical pulses are sent to the ultrasound machine in order to 
process and transform them into an image on the monitor. While the emitted sound 
wave is transformed as an echo by the woman’s body, a data set about the womb and 
the fetus is inscribed on them.17 Then, ultrasound machine processes the necessary 
inscribed data to locate and determine the level of illumination/brightness of each 
pixel on the monitor. Therefore, the arc-shaped ultrasound fetal image appears on the 
monitor as a cumulative surface effect of illuminating pixels, which might be called 
“light itself.” (Fig. 2.35) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.35. Ultrasound of second-trimester fetus (Van Dijck, 2005, p. 105) 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The ultrasound machine is designed to determine three different data from each received echo: 
Which transducer element received the echo, the strength of the echo, and the time lapse between the 
transmission of the sound wave and the return of the echo.  
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2.6. What Makes the Ultrasound Fetal Image Distinct? 
 
There are historically three types of fetal images before the ultrasound fetal image, as 
explained above. These are illustrated fetal images in midwifery manuals, medical 
dictionaries, and obstetrical anatomy atlases; X-ray fetal images; and Nilsson’s fetal 
photographs. All of these different types of fetal images correspond to different 
technologies in medical imaging.   
 
The illustrative fetal images are reproduced by drawing and printing in an artistic 
mode of representation. X-ray fetal images are reproduced by imposing electro-
magnetic waves on the pregnant body and having a fetal image on a photographic 
plate. Nilsson’s fetal photographs are, at the beginning, the photographic 
reproduction of the dead fetuses in the studio; later he used fiber-optics technology to 
make photographic shootings in the uterus of the pregnant women, called fetoscopy. 
Whatever the medical imaging technology used in these different types of fetal 
images, the mode of representation of the female body and its relation with the fetus 
are same. The representation of the fetus is the primary form in the frame and the 
female body becomes an ecological environment for the fetus or is totally 
obliterated.  
 
Until the invention of X-ray and ultrasound and their use in obstetrics, fetal images 
were reproduced by two different modes of medical imaging technologies. The first 
one was the artistic reproduction of fetal images as illustrations on paper by drawing 
and/or printing. These were the fetal images in midwifery manuals, obstetrical and 
anatomical atlases until the end of the nineteenth century. The second mode of 
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medical imaging technology was the photographic reproduction of fetal images by 
using photographic camera. These fetal images took their places mainly, but not 
only, in medical publishing.  
 
Therefore, today, with the addition of X-ray and ultrasound we have three different 
modes of technologies for the reproduction of fetal images with different mimetic 
capacities. When they are chronologically put, first there is fetal illustration or 
simply fetal pictures. Secondly, there is fetal photography, which is mostly 
pronounced with the name of Nilsson. Both of these analogue technologies are under 
the hegemony of naturalistic or realistic mimetic capacities of the technology used. 
Therefore, for medicine/obstetrics, variations in the fetal images until X-ray and 
ultrasound only come out with respect to the mimetic/analogical capacities of the 
tools in illustration or the apparatus in photography.18   
 
Finally, there is a third mode of technology in which fetal image is reproduced: 
“electronic” medical imaging which involves the use of X-ray and ultrasound.19 
Electronic medical imaging technologies, which are also called “inscription 
technologies” (Van Dijck, 2005, p. 15), do not “depend on an observing subject or its 
                                                 
18 Here, I utilize the distinction between “tool” and “apparatus” made by Flusser (1984). According to 
him, the difference between a tool and an apparatus is more than the difference between their mimetic 
capacities. Flusser simply defines tool as “a simulation of a body organ which does work” (1984, p. 
61) and then continues his definition, “tools as such are objects which remove other objects from 
nature to put them where we are –in order to produce them. In doing so, they change the original form 
of those objects, impose a new form on them; in other words, tools inform objects” (p. 16). The chalk, 
pen, or brush of the draftsman in illustrating the female body, womb or fetus is this sort of tool, which 
is an extension of the hand and/or finger(s). An apparatus is simply “a toy which simulates thought” 
(Flusser, 1984, p. 60) and “apparatus do inform, they do simulate human organs, not the eyes (…), 
they do have recourse to science, people do act as a function of them, and there are indeed intentions 
and interests hidden within apparatus. (…) Automation is essential” to apparatus (Flusser, 1984, p.17). 
Following this, ultrasonographic apparatus can be considered as the toy of the obstetrician, which 
simulates the obstetrical thinking on the female body, womb, and fetus. 
19 Electronic imaging technologies are not limited to X-rays and ultrasonography. They include a 
wide range of techniques in medical use, such as computed tomography imaging (CTI), magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI), positron emission tomography (PET), etc. and non-medical use such as 
robotic image recognition, ray tracing, texture mapping, virtual reality simulators, etc. 
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surrogate, the camera” (Newman, 1996, p. 107). According to Newman (1996), 
“they are not analog media dependent on a point of view located in real space: they 
signify no “particularized individuality,” and they make no “deictic declaration: this 
is how I see”” (p. 107). In Van Dijck’s words, “they seek to dispose of mediation 
(such as an artist’s drawing) and instead record the interior body directly onto a 
machine” (2005, p.15). Therefore, the representation schema of the fetal image 
reproduced by the electronic obstetric imaging operates differently than the 
naturalistic or realistic mimesis/analogy. Hence ultrasound fetal images—which are 
the most common electronic images in obstetrics today—are mathematical reading, 
formulation, ad encoding of the data about the inner elements of the female body, 
and specifically the womb, and decoding by transforming this data into an image on 
the monitor by rendering the intensity of light. Of course, this is an electronic seeing, 
which is totally different than a deictic declaration (“this is how I see”). Hence, for 
layperson it is difficult to see, read, and understand these images. And the trained 
medical gaze of the obstetrician once again is in operation and he not only reads 
these images for pregnant woman and her partner, but makes a translation as well.  
 
One of the ideals of medicine has always been to make the body “transparent” (Van 
Dijck, 2005, p. 15). The artistic/photographic analogue medical imaging 
technologies served the ideal of transparency by dissecting corpses.20 In artistic 
medical imaging, the draftsman is expected to illustrate by his pen each ‘important’21 
                                                 
20 For a detailed analysis on the genealogy of the dissection of corpses see the chapter “Open up a few 
Corpses” in Foucault’s book Birth of the Clinic. 
21 There has been a struggle between the anatomist and the draftsman with respect to each one’s 
perception of  ‘important’ thing(s) in what they see during the dissection. Duden (1993) puts this 
conflict very well by quoting from Soemmering, who is one of the admirers of William Hunter: “It is 
well known how difficult it is to find the right kind of draftsman, who is capable of seeing clearly 
what the anatomist demands from him, and is not too stubborn to let himself be guided in this job” (p. 
40). And she explains that, “Soemmering knows that the struggle is about that which shall be seen, 
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detail of tissues and organs of the corpse that is exposed to light by the scalpel of the 
anatomist. In photographic medical imaging, the photographer is expected to pose 
each important phase of the fetal development on to the light-sensitive emulsion of 
the film by his camera. In either case, a cadaver—a dead body—is cut open and/or 
exposed to light to see the mechanism of life.22 In other words, in both artistic and 
photographic medical imaging technologies, the female body is made cadaverous in 
order to see the fetus inside of it. Hence, in a sense, the mimetic/analogue fetal image 
is a “still life” in the cadaverous female body both by artistic and photographic 
medical imaging technologies.  
 
The invention of the electronic medical imaging technologies, and especially the 
ultrasound, signified the beginning of another phase of the project of making the 
body transparent. These new electronic medical imaging technologies reproduce the 
fetal image without having to cut the female body open or physically penetrate into 
it. Therefore, they are categorized as “non-invasive” technologies.  
 
Ultrasound fetal images affect people not only because of the non-invasive character 
of its technology but also because of their immediacy. Ultrasound renders electronic 
fetal images on the monitor both in motion and in real time. These are “live” 
electronic images of the fetus. Hence, the invention of ultrasound symbolizes a 
revolutionary shift from still life to “life itself.” Obstetrics widens its corpus of 
knowledge by extending the possibility of additional observation, measurement and 
calculation on the live images of the fetus. While obstetrics has always been 
                                                                                                                                          
between the anatomist who “knows” what ought to be there and captured by the artist, and the artist 
who sees the object for himself” (Duden, 1993, p.41).  
22 Foucault (1991) aphoristically states the funtion of dissection as, “The living night is dissipated in 
the brightness of death” (p.146). 
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passionate to put under surveillance the pregnancy and to govern the female body, 
the invention of the ultrasound is both motivated and effected the disciplinary 
focalization of the obstetrics on the fetus through the ultrasound fetal image. 
Therefore, a new sub-discipline emerged in obstetrics called “fetology.” In a sense, 
fetology can be considered as the ethical legitimization and professional justification 
of the obstetrics in making the fetus ‘real’ patient in the core of the body, and making 
the female body a peripheral element, an ecological environment on the way to 
obliteration. 
 
As Kevin Robins (1996) states, “it is said that we are undergoing an ‘image 
revolution’ on an unprecedented scale, and this supposed revolution is then 
associated with the historical transition to a postmodern era.” (p. 3) Whether modern 
or postmodern, it is obvious that we are living in an age of images. But this 
‘revolution’ has another component that is mostly neglected: sound. We should 
perhaps re-write Robins’ above statement: we are undergoing an audio-visual 
revolution (rather than just an image revolution). The ultrasound image does not 
merely put sound and image together. As a form of image produced electronically 
through sound and echo, it occupies a strange and strategic place in the so-called 
audio-visual revolution of our time.  
 
In the audio-visual age, images are mostly electronic, including ultrasound fetal 
images. Here, it should be underlined that electronic images differ from others in one 
important respect: they are produced by light itself, instead of projecting or printing 
the image by light on a surface as it is done in cinema or photography. Electronic 
images are produced by electrical/electronic processes and are rendered on a monitor 
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as the accumulation of illuminating lights. Given that the ultrasound fetal image is 
also often described in terms of “life itself,” it becomes a singular kind of electronic 
image, which brings the concepts of “life” and “light” together.  
 
The constitutive connection between light and life is indeed a very old one. It is 
possible to observe it in religious and mythical belief systems. This is a major factor 
that explains the popularity of the ultrasound fetal image as the very appearance of 
the beginning or origin of life. We thus see, once more, that, first of all, technological 
progress does not make ancient ideas and beliefs disappear but rather gives them new 
conditions and puts them in new contexts; secondly, articulating life and light under 
new conditions, the ultrasound fetal image is based on certain philosophical, 
political, ethical, legal and religious presuppositions about life.23     
 
In the following chapter, I will present and elaborate Foucault’s and Irigaray’s works 
and will assemble a new theoretical framework which brings the two together on the 
particular question of ultrasound fetal image.  
 
 
                                                 
23 These arguments are mostly related with the abortion/anti-abortion debate especially in the Western 
literature (which I have utilized much). In this thesis, I am not dealing directly with this issue. My 
main concern is the phallogocularcentric construction of the ultrasound fetal image and the female 
body in our world of understanding, seeing and giving meaning. Therefore, I will elaborate the 
ultrasound fetal image in a critical way by taking it to the site to which it belong, i.e. the female body, 
in a Foucauldian and Irigarayan framework. And, finally, I aim to constitute an alternative framework 
to see and think ultrasound fetal images through the female body by returning to abortion/anti-
abortion debate. 
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3. ASSEMBLING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
I will use the theoretical frameworks and methodologies of Michel Foucault and 
Luce Irigaray in a complementary way in an effort to develop a theoretical analysis 
of the ultrasound fetal image. Both Foucault’s and Irigaray’s critical positions are 
quite distinct in the trajectory of Western thought, and I will first describe their 
singular positions. Secondly, I will present their approaches and will discuss the 
place of each in my project. Finally, I will establish a theoretical and methodological 
framework depending on the Foucauldian and Irigarayan perspectives. 
 
I will first discuss Foucault’s concept of medical gaze. I will however take this early 
Foucauldian concept in the context of his later theory of power-knowledge and the 
concept of bio-power. My emphasis here will be on the ways how the concept of 
medical gaze produces an entirely new approach to body, life and death. This will 
enable me to focus on how the female body and its procreative potential are 
governed by the discipline of obstetrics, that is, what I am going to call the 
obstetricization of the female body. Emphasizing the historical discontinuity which 
produced the modern medical gaze, I will argue that the ultrasound fetal image is a 
further instance of this modern institutionalization. Medical imaging technologies, 
ultrasound technology in particular, have been used in the disciplining and 
normalization of women’s bodies, which is also a process of pathologizing the 
female body. Further, fetal images are perceived as representing the human subject in 
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its earliest form. This perception leads to the birth of a new sub-discipline called 
“fetology”.  
 
I will then turn to Irigaray’s texts and will focus on her mimetic and homeopathic 
strategy in deconstructing the phallogocentric logic. The obstetrical clinic can be 
regarded as a “phallogocularcentric” staging in which the ultrasound fetal image 
occupies the center scene. How to break the silence of the pregnant woman lying on 
the gynecological table watching her body’s interiority illuminated by the 
phallomorphic and phallocratic male vision and voice? I will pose the question of 
how Irigaray’s mimicry can be employed in such a setting to subvert it and to re-
write fetal images as productions of woman’s body. The purpose here is to shift the 
image from a phallomorphic site to a vulvomorphic one, from the phallic medical 
gaze to the woman’s touching gaze. I would like to suggest that this touching gaze 
can be regarded as an inscription written by the echo of woman’s body, which is no 
longer a merely receptive surface but a mobius band whose turns, folds and 
reverbations are productive of images. 
 
3.1. The Foucauldian Perspective 
 
Michel Foucault stands out as one of the significant radical philosophers of the 
twentieth century. His conception of power not only completely differs from the 
political theorists who usually follow “totalitarian theories”24 but, when put together 
with his theorization of “knowledge,” also forms the main axis in his writings. 
                                                 
24 Although Foucault does not deny “global, totalitarian theories” such as Marxism and 
psychoanalysis as useful tools for local research in a fairly consistent fashion, he underlines their 
“inhibiting effect”. He explains this inhibiting effect as a hindrance brought to research by their 
attempt to think only in terms of totality. (Foucault, 1980a, pp. 80-81). 
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Foucault exposes different forms of power/knowledge operating on the body of the 
modern Western individual and society, through his historical strategy called 
genealogy, and by doing so he opens ways to new forms of political struggle and 
resistance.   
 
In what follows, I will first describe briefly Foucault’s position in the contemporary 
social theory. I will then explain his conception of the medical gaze and his general 
perspective on the historical change in the forms and techniques of power and 
conceptions of the body in Western culture. Lastly, I will develop a Foucauldian 
framework that may help us to understand the ultrasound fetal image in a critical 
way. 
 
3.1.1. Approaching Foucault 
 
As Paul A. Bové (1988) states in the foreword to the English translation of Gilles 
Deleuze’s book Foucault, it is difficult to situate Foucault in contemporary political 
and social theory. 
 
Because there is commonly such a buzz of contradictory comment going 
on around him—as his friends and enemies push him to the left, right, 
and center or sometimes off the political spectrum altogether—Foucault 
could assert that it proves what he contends: conventional categories 
really don’t fit him; he is posing an entirely new and different set of 
questions about a whole range of sometimes unthought of matters. (Bové, 
1988, p. viii) 
 
In his early period, in a series of studies under the methodological title 
“archaeology,” Foucault utilized a version of structuralist method in which the 
objective laws governing all human activity are laid out, as a reaction to 
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phenomenological concept of a meaning-giving transcendental subject. For example, 
in his books Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault analyzes 
the rule-governed systems of the asylum and the hospital as institutional and 
discursive practices on the body of the insane and the patient as historically produced 
objects.  
 
It can be said that, although Foucault used structuralism and interpretive methods, he 
was not exclusively a structuralist, nor an adherent of hermeneutics. He might be 
better described as thinker of historical change and discontinuity25. His particular 
concern was to understand the minute historical and institutional transformations that 
led to the emergence of a modern culture at the level of institutional and everyday 
experience. Foucault shows how certain institutional structures and cultural practices 
have produced modern individuals by developing new forms of power and 
knowledge. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) briefly formulate the contribution of 
Foucault to social theory as “heightened methodological sophistication and a unique 
emphasis on the body as the place in which the most minute and local social 
practices are linked up with the large scale organization of power” (p. xxvi).  
 
Foucault concentrates on the question of how the human sciences study and 
understand human beings. First he points out the historical turn of the human 
sciences at the end of the eighteenth century. At this point, he formulates his 
conception of power and its relation with knowledge. He pays special attention to the 
exercise of power on the bodies of individuals and the ways in which the notions of 
                                                 
25 When Foucault is asked what he thinks about “discontinuity, ” he responds, “my problem was not at 
all to say, ‘Voilá’, long live discontinuity, we are in the discontinuous and a good thing too’, but to 
pose the question, ‘How is it that at certain moments, and in certain orders of knowledge, there are 
(...) sudden take-offs, (...) hastenings of evolution, (...) transformations which fail to correspond to the 
calm, continuoust image that is normally acredited?’” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 112). 
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life and death are re-conceptualized in such an exercise. So Foucault’s method is not 
purely linguistic and is strongly influenced by Nietzsche’s genealogical approach to 
the history of the body. Foucault employs Nietzschean genealogy26 by especially 
using it as a key for understanding the historical change in the forms of power as 
relations of force and their exercise on the body. He shows how certain institutional 
structures and cultural practices have produced dividing practices for the sake of 
normalizing and governing individuals through their bodies by developing new 
conceptions of medical gaze, power/knowledge and bio-power. 
 
3.1.2. Medical Gaze  
 
In his unconventional history of modern medicine, The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault 
elaborates a concept of “medical gaze.” The medical gaze forms the defining feature 
of the modern clinic. He aims to find out “how the medical gaze was 
institutionalized, how it was effectively inscribed in social space, how the new form 
of the hospital was at once the effect and support of (this) new type of gaze” 
(Foucault, 1980c, p. 147).  
 
There are two important aspects in Foucault’s archaeology of medical gaze. First of 
all, the medical gaze is a complex perceptual formation in which audition and touch 
                                                 
26 It is problematic to call genealogy a historical method in the conventional sense since “genealogy 
opposes itself to traditional historical method” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 106). Although 
Foucault is not in full accord with Nietzsche, he utilizes genealogy as his historical strategy—
preceding his method of “archeology” in his major works in the 1970s—because of its theoretical 
coherence and practical ability to let Foucault write the history of the present on power/knowledge, 
and the body. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) briefly outline genealogy in comparison to traditional 
historical methodology as follows: “For the genealogist there are no fixed essences, no underlying 
laws, no metaphysical finalities. Genealogy seeks out dicontinuities where others found continuous 
development. It finds recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness. It records the 
past of mankind to unmask the solemn hymns of progress. Genealogy avoids the search for depth. 
Instead it seeks the surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts, and subtle contours” (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1983, p. 106). 
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are also involved. Secondly, “the medical gaze required a new concept of pathology 
as well as a shift in the place of death in the medical field” (Mutman and Ocak, 
2008, p. 23). 
 
The medical gaze is not a merely neutral and scientific gaze, but a singular and 
complex perceptual-linguistic formation whose rationale is to make the invisible 
pathological body visible and readable. The most important step in the evolution of 
the medical gaze is when a symptom becomes a sign for the doctor to speak. This 
also signifies the birth of the clinical method which “was bound up with the 
emergence of the doctor’s gaze into the field of signs and symptoms” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 91). Before the medical gaze, diseases were conceived by means of 
classification. With the appearance of the new element of time and progression, it 
became possible to restore the disease at the level of words, in terms of a “history” 
and a “case” that covers its total being (Foucault, 1991, pp. 94-96).  
 
The history of the medical gaze involves a two-stage process. First, the observing 
gaze became non-interfering: characterized by a supreme attentiveness divorced 
from any theory or philosophy, the silent and gestureless clinical gaze acquired the 
paradoxical ability to hear a language as soon as it perceived a spectacle (Foucault, 
1991, pp. 107-108). Hospital was the new architectural space that arranged the 
distribution of light and dark, opaque and transparent, seen and unseen; it was 
transformed into a neutral and homogenous domain where the gaze learned to 
construct its own method of effective observation and diagnosis. This enabled the 
medical gaze to turn gradually, in a second step, from a non-interfering gaze into a 
predictive, directing one. The observing gaze now developed a new ability to see 
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“the tangible spaces of the body, which at the same time is that opaque mass in 
which secrets, invisible lesions and the very mystery of origins lie hidden” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 122). This was the moment of “opening up a few corpses” to allow the gaze 
to penetrate into the secrets of the body. The result was the production of what 
Foucault called the “visible invisible”. This was parallel to a radical change in the 
concept of disease: it was no longer attacking life from outside, but now it implied 
the more complicated idea of pathological life. Morbid phenomena are thus 
understood on the basis of the same text of life (Foucault, 1991, p. 153). Further, this 
new concept of disease was accompanied with a new type of sign, the anatomo-
clinical sign. The new sign was no longer an extension of the symptom but it was a 
marginal, restricted, imperceptible sign, diagonally traversing the visible body of 
disease. It belonged to a convergent series, a random configuration. If the earlier 
clinical sign focused on disease, the new anatomo-clinical (or anatomo-pathological) 
sign focused on the lesion.   
 
The new methods of seeing, hearing and touching attempted to read projectively the 
lesional signs and to locate the disease within the body of the patient. Signs projected 
upon the living body an anatomico-pathological series. The task was now analyzing 
the series and mapping the volume of the body. Foucault describes this new 
perceptual configuration in terms of the “sight/touch/hearing trinity”: “the 
inaccessible illness is tracked down by markers, gauged in depth, drawn to the 
surface, and projected virtually on the dispersed organs of the corpse” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 164). It was now possible to assign the invisible spatially. According to 
Foucault (1991), the eye does not have the most important function here. It is touch 
that enables the doctor to locate “visceral tumours, scirrhous masses, swellings of the 
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ovary, and dilations of the heart”, whereas the ear allowed him to hear the crackling 
bones and the rumbling arteries. “The medical gaze is now endowed with a 
plurisensorial structure. A gaze that touches, hears, and, moreover, not by essence or 
necessity, sees” (Foucault, 1991, p. 164). 
 
The medical gaze thus admits a highly complex structure. Its privilege does not 
depend on a simple, natural and innocent capacity of pure observation but on its 
homogenizing the sensorial complexity. The medical discourse can produce its 
statements once the hegemony of the gaze over the other senses is established. The 
gaze is hegemonic to the extent it provides the principle of the production of 
visibility and intelligibility of new objects such as tissual lesions.  
 
The multi-sensorial perception is a way of anticipating the triumph of the gaze, 
which will finally be represented, according to Foucault, by autopsy. The other 
senses are regarded as supplementary. It is only death that provides the triumph of 
the sovereign gaze by “bring(ing) to truth the luminous presence of the visible” 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 165). Only when life is completely stabilized it can produce a 
visible and intelligible form—at least before the decay of the body. The very 
visibility or the scene of life is thus indistinguishable from death: Foucault calls this 
visibility “invisible visibility” (Foucault, 1991, p. 165). It is “the structure … that 
commands clinical anatomy and all medicine that derives from it” (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 165). The “structure” governs plurisensorial and heterogeneous forces by which 
what is invisible is made visible, accessible and intelligible.  
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3.1.3. Power/Knowledge 
 
Now, I would like to present Foucault’s conception of power and its interaction with 
knowledge. According to Foucault (1980a), there is a common point in the liberal 
and Marxist conceptions of power. He calls this common point as “an economism in 
the theory of power” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 88). In the liberal, juridical theory, “power 
is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one 
can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or partially, through a legal act 
or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through cession or 
contract” Foucault, 1980a, p. 88). Although the Marxist conception of power is 
formulated in a totally different way, there is still an inherent economism in the 
theorization of it, “which one might term an economic functionality of power. This 
economic functionality is present to the extent that power is conceived primarily in 
terms of the role it plays in the maintenance of production and of class domination 
which the development and specific forms of production have rendered possible” 
(Foucault, 1980a, p. 88). Thus Foucault briefly states the economism in the 
liberal/juridical and the Marxist conceptions of power as follows:  
 
In the first case we have a political power whose formal model is 
discoverable in the process of exchange, the economic circulation of 
commodities; in the second case, the historical raison d’être of political 
power and the principle of its concrete forms and actual functioning, is 
located in the economy (Foucault, 1980a, p. 89).  
 
Foucault seeks to conduct a non-economic analysis of power which leads his 
genealogical research and writings to flow into different directions and obstinately 
pursue different forms of power.27 He employs varying tools and means in his 
                                                 
27 In his genealogial research and writings, Foucault attempts less toward a “theory” of power than 
toward an “analytics” of power, that is “toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations 
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analysis. First, he asserts that “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, 
but rather exercised, and it only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 89). Secondly, 
he re-defines power as “a relation of force” rather than “the maintenance and 
reproduction of economic relations” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 89). These two assertions 
make it necessary to pose questions such as what the exercise of power involves; 
how power is exercised; what kind of mechanisms operate in its exercise; and of 
what power consists. Foucault (1980a) states that “there is an immediate answer that 
many contemporary analyses would appear to offer: power is essentially that which 
represses. Power represses nature, the instincts, a class, individuals. (…) In any case, 
it has become almost automatic in the parlance of the times to define power as an 
organ of repression” (pp. 89-90). But, according to him, the notion of repression is 
wholly inadequate to the analysis of the mechanisms and effects of power. He 
exposes in his genealogical writings that the mechanisms of power formations are 
“something quite other, or in any case something much more, than repression” 
(Foucault, 1980a, p. 90) and specifically emphasizes that “the history of the last 
centuries in Western societies did not manifest the movement of a power that was 
essentially repressive” (Foucault, 1990, p. 81). 
 
Foucault relates these mechanisms of power to two points of reference: “on the one 
hand, to the rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of power; on the other, 
to the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in their turn 
reproduce this power” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 93). He asserts that, in any society, 
relations of power can only be established by “the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 93) which constitutes 
                                                                                                                                          
of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 82). 
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the truth for the social body. Thus the general terrain of his concern becomes “the 
rules of right, the mechanisms of power and the effects of truth” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 
94). Then he seeks to adopt the methodological imperatives and precautions to his 
general terrain of research. He argues that “in the very first place, it seemed 
important to accept that the analysis in question should not concern itself with the 
regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general 
mechanisms through which they operate” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 96). Instead, Foucault 
focuses on the local, regional, material institutions (such as hospital, asylum, prison, 
etc.) in which extreme forms of power are embodied and exercised with specific 
techniques and effective apparatuses, which are less legal in character.   
 
In his search for an appropriate method, “a second methodological precaution urged 
that the analysis should not concern itself with the power at the level of conscious 
intention or decision; that it should not consider power from its internal point of 
view” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 97). In other words, we should refrain from the questions 
of who possesses power and what his aim is. Instead, the invested intention of power, 
its real and effective practices should be sought, where it installs itself. The exercise 
of power “at the level of on-going subjugation as continuous and uninterrupted 
processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictates our behaviours, 
etc.” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 97). 
 
Foucault puts his third methodological precaution as power should not be taken as 
the consolidated and homogenous domination of one individual, of one group or of 
one class over others. In other words, “power is not that which makes the difference 
between those who exclusively posses and retain it and those who do not have it and 
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submit to it” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 98). Foucault develops a new paradigmatic point of 
view by taking power as circulating and functioning in the form of a chain, without 
being localising or being possessed.28 “And not only do individuals circulate between 
its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 98). 
 
The network established by power, which makes it freely circulate, should not lead 
only to a descending model of analysis that absolutely takes power as something 
distributed from a center to the molecular elements of society. According to 
Foucault, rather an “ascending analysis of power” should be conducted, “starting 
from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own 
trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of 
power have been—and continue to be—invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, 
transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by 
forms of global domination” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 99).  
 
Foucault’s last methodological precaution is about directing our researches not to the 
State apparatuses and the ideologies accompanying them but towards “the production 
of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge” which 
are “methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation 
and research, apparatuses of control” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 102). Power is exercised 
through these mechanisms. It organizes and puts into circulation apparatuses of 
knowledge rather than ideological constructs. 
                                                 
28 In his book The History of the Sexuality, Foucault formulates this methodological precaution as 
“power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on or allows to 
slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile 
relations” (Foucault, 1990, p. 94). 
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In sum, with these methodological precautions, Foucault overcomes the classical 
assumptions on power through the sovereignty of state, the form of the law, or the 
overall unity of domination. According to him, these are only “terminal forms” 
power takes and he claims that power must be understood  
 
in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the 
sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and 
confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support 
which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a 
system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which 
isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they 
take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the 
various social hegemonies (Foucault, 1990, pp. 92-93).  
 
Foucault’s concept of power particularly focuses on its interaction with knowledge. 
Indeed, for Foucault, this is more than an interaction, and it will lead him to use 
“power/knowledge” as a single concept, which consists of the concepts “power” and 
“knowledge” separately but in relation rather than in terms of a unity. The main 
obstacle is the tradition that makes us believe that “knowledge can exist only where 
the power relations are suspended” (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). According to Foucault, 
“we should admit rather that power produces knowledge (…); that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1995, p. 27). 
Therefore, power/knowledge is a relational concept that is formed by two singular 
concepts. 
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Towards the eighteenth century, a new mechanism of power emerged, or rather is 
invented, which possesses “highly different procedural techniques, completely novel 
instruments, quite different apparatuses” and most importantly incompatible with the 
relations of sovereignty (Foucault, 1980a, p. 104). Totally different from the 
mechanisms of sovereign power, which depends upon the Earth and its products, this 
new mechanism of non-sovereign power is more dependent upon bodies. Foucault 
calls this new type of power “bio-power.”  
 
3.1.4. Bio-Power 
 
Foucault produces the concept of bio-power in distinction from more traditional 
concepts and forms of power such as the sovereign power: “For a long time, one of 
the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was to decide life and death” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 135). This sovereign power was being exercised through “a right 
of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (Foucault, 1990, p. 136). 
Starting from the seventeenth century, sovereign power over death (ultimately the 
seizure of “life itself”) changed into new forms and mechanisms of power through 
parallel changes in political, economic, social, and philosophical realms in Western 
societies. There was a development not only in education (universities, secondary 
schools) and the army, but also in the fields of political practice and economic 
observation of population. 
 
The new form of power came out by fostering “life itself.” Foucault (1990) states 
that “the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully 
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supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” 
(p. 139). He calls this new form of power “bio-power.”  
 
In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life 
evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; 
they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a 
whole intermediary cluster of relations (Foucault, 1990, p. 139). 
 
One of these forms is “disciplinary power.” Disciplinary power is the knowledge of 
and power over the individual body. While representing the body as “a machine,” 
disciplinary practices exercised power and produced knowledge on capacities, 
gestures, movements, location and behavior of the body to make the individual more 
powerful, productive as well as useful and docile. Foucault (1990) describes this new 
formation as “an anatomo-politics of the human body” (p. 139). Disciplinary 
practices were “embodied in institutions such as the army and the schools, and in 
reflections on tactics, apprenticeship, education, and the nature of societies” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 140). Disciplinary practices utilized techniques such as 
surveillance, examination, and discipline. Rather than the threat of violence or force, 
disciplinary practices diffuse into the individual (body) by creating desires and by 
attaching individuals to specific identities.  
 
The other form of bio-power is “regulatory power.” While focusing on the “species 
body,” regulatory power as the “bio-politics of the population” exercised power and 
produced knowledge on biological processes affecting birth, death, the level of 
health and longevity (Foucault, 1990, p. 139). Regulatory power is inscribed in 
demography to develop policies and interventions for governing the population, such 
as “the evaluation of the relationship between resources and inhabitants, the 
constructing of tables analyzing wealth and its circulation” (Foucault, 1990, p. 140). 
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Hence the biological body of the individual becomes the main concern of “political 
practices and economic observation, of the problems of birth rate, longevity, public 
health, housing, and migration” (Foucault, 1990, p. 140).   
 
Therefore, on the one hand, a benevolent bio-power emerged, a power “whose 
highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 139). On the other hand, the same benevolent power brought 
“numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations” (Foucault, 1990, p. 140). Hence Foucault attempts to show 
how these forms of power play a significant role in the “normalization” of the 
modern individual through its body.  
 
3.1.5. Developing a Foucauldian Framework 
 
I would like to argue that the medical gaze is already an instance of power-
knowledge. While this particular form of observation enables a specific form of 
knowledge such as the medical knowledge of the human body, it is also a 
constitutive part of a particular medical institution such as the clinic. Hence it might 
be said that the clinical form of medical authority and power and the knowledge of 
the body obtained through medical gaze are in a reciprocally constitutive 
relationship. It can also be argued that the medical power/knowledge is 
“disciplinary” in the sense of producing individuals as patients and disciplining the 
patient’s body as well as “regulatory” in the sense of the larger societal implications 
and connections of hospitals and medical knowledge with health policies, population 
growth, various social measures, etc. However, once we articulate the notion of 
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power into the concept of medical gaze, we have to bring up the issue of gender 
relations. This necessarily complicates Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge.    
 
According to feminist theorist Sawicki (1991), “although Foucault intended to” in his 
book The History of Sexuality, “he never wrote a history of women’s bodies” (p. 67). 
Indeed, he was planning a part of this book “to be a study of the sexualization of 
women’s bodies and of concepts of pathology related to it” (Sawicki, 1991, p. 67). In 
addition to this,  
 
Foucault intended to locate the processes through which women’s bodies 
were controlled through a set of discourses and practices governing both 
the individual’s body and the health, education and welfare of the 
population, namely, the discourse and practices of “bio-power” (Sawicki, 
1991, p. 67). 
 
I aim to utilize Foucault’s methodological framework and his emphasis on the body 
through his distinct conception of “bio-power” and its related conceptual network, 
especially the concept of “power/knowledge.” The disciplinary techniques put into 
operation through the “medical gaze” (with its technological apparatuses for 
governing and normalizing the female body) may help us to conceive the ultrasound 
fetal image in a critical way and take this image to the site it belongs, i.e. the female 
body.  
 
The reproduction of the ultrasound fetal images in the obstetric clinic, as well as their 
distribution in the culture at large by different media, are all in need of a Foucauldian 
analysis. The aim of such an analysis is to expose the specific mechanisms of a 
political technology of the body through which power/knowledge is articulated 
specifically with the female body. Ultrasound fetal images must be seen and 
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understood from a specific point of view that aims to unfold their politico-technical 
production and reproduction, through the medical examination, manipulation and 
construction of the female body. 
 
Although feminist writers such as Sawicki and Bartky agree with the Foucauldian 
position on the issue of new reproductive technologies—including the ultrasound 
screening of fetal images—especially by regarding such technologies as a 
“potentially insidious form of social control,” they also make a significant criticism 
of the Foucault’s work (Sawicki, 1991, p. 70). Both Sawicki and Bartky emphasize 
that Foucault fails to address the gendered character of the body in his studies. 
According to Bartky, Foucault does not see, or at least does not mention, the 
difference between the bodies of women and men. Bartky (1988) states this 
concisely when she writes:   
 
Foucault treats the body throughout as it were one, as if the bodily 
experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women 
bore the same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life 
(p. 63). 
 
Therefore, according to Bartky (1988), Foucault is blind to “those disciplines that 
produce a modality of embodiment that is peculiarly feminine” (p. 64). She 
concludes:    
 
To overlook the forms of subjection that engender the feminine body is 
to perpetuate the silence and powerlessness of those upon whom these 
disciplines have been imposed. Hence, even though a liberatory note is 
sounded in Foucault’s critique of power, his analysis as a whole 
reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout Western political 
theory (Bartky, 1988, p. 64). 
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It is important to underline that these feminist criticisms do not call for a wholesale 
dismissal of Foucault’s work; rather they are carefully made, specific criticisms that 
have learned from Foucault and have been directed at a certain aspect of his thought. 
In order to overcome this lack in Foucault’s genealogies of medical gaze and modern 
sexuality and to present a more complicated and gender-focused approach, now I 
would like to turn to Luce Irigaray’s feminist deconstruction.  
 
3.2. Luce Irigaray: Deconstructing Phallogocentrism 
 
Luce Irigaray is not just a feminist, a political figure. Indeed with her original 
readings of Western philosophical texts from Plato to Heidegger and with her 
singular approach to psychoanalysis, she stands out as a significant original thinker 
in contemporary intellectual and academic scene. Irigaray mainly focuses on the 
“phallogocentrism” of Western thought. She attempts to transform the social and 
symbolic order in a radical way. Her target is the Western metaphysical thought and 
representational systematicity of language which are both “phallomorphic” in logic 
and form, and “phallocratic” in institutionalization. Irigaray’s aim is to construct the 
general parameters or matrix for a new symbolic order in which sexual difference 
will be recognized. This is no less than developing a new language, logic and form 
which will replace phallomorphic order with a “vulvomorphic” one. Irigaray calls 
this “the culture of the two,” in distinction from the phallocratic and specular 
“culture of the one” in which we live.   
 
In this section, I will first focus on Irigaray’s strategic “style” of (re)reading and 
(re)writing the Western metaphysical texts to expose their “phallogocularcentric” 
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nature. I will then develop an Irigarayan strategy that enables me to frame the 
ultrasound fetal images in a new way which takes account of the constitutive role of 
the female body in their production.  
 
3.2.1. Binary Oppositions and Sexual Difference 
 
There are many ways of approaching to Irigaray’s thought. I would like to begin with 
Margaret Whitford’s description of her as “a philosopher of change” (Whitford, 
1991, p. 15). By this fine description, Whitford underlines Irigaray’s project of 
producing the conditions under which the status of the female might be altered in the 
symbolic realm.  
 
Following Whitford, Naomi Schor too defines Irigaray’s project as “a radical 
transformation of the social and symbolic order” (Schor, 1994, p. 11). Then, the 
question will be why this kind of radical transformation is necessary and essential. 
According to Irigaray, the Western metaphysical tradition has been constituted in a 
phallogocentric framework, i.e. a form of logocentrism, which also takes phallus as 
privileged form and meaning of its constitution. This phallogocentric framework 
established and occupied philosophy and philosophical texts in a “phallomorphic” 
form and logic. Hence, philosophy and philosophical texts theoretically elaborated 
and further reinforced the phallocratic symbolic order and economy.  
 
According to Irigaray, all the phallogocentric constructions of Western metaphysics 
are operationalized by binary oppositions that work in and by language and the 
representational system. The terms of a binary opposition do not have equal force. 
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One is the dominant and the other is the subordinate. What makes a term subordinate 
is the fact it always gets defined by the characteristics of the dominant. This is why, 
in a binary opposition, while the subordinate term appears as lacking certain 
characteristics, these characteristics happen to be the ones that the hegemonic term 
“naturally” has. In other words, the hegemonic or dominant term constitutes a 
sameness with regard to which the subordinate term becomes other. Commonly 
known binary oppositions of a given culture, binary oppositions such as “masculine 
vs. feminine”, “culture vs. nature”, “active vs. passive” operate by a teleology of 
transforming the subordinate term to the “Other” of the dominant term’s “Same.” If 
we give a summary view of patriarchy (i.e. the opposition of “man vs. woman”) 
according to Irigaray, we can say that it begins by defining “woman” as lacking 
certain characteristics; that is, it associates her with a series of characteristics which 
identifies her with lack of proper reasoning: she is loving and caring … emotional … 
weak … lacking rationality …  lacking in general … not fully human subject. It thus 
becomes obvious who has these characteristics: “Man” becomes the representative of 
human species. According to this (phallocratic) logic, “Man” can gather himself 
together, can unify himself under the guidance of his reason, and is therefore “One”: 
man is the sex which is one, i.e. phallus. Not being the Same and not being One, 
woman is Other (Irigaray, 1985, p. 74).    
 
Thus the feminine sexuality, imaginary, and language have been “conceptualized on 
the basis of masculine parameters” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 23). According to Irigaray, all 
the differences can only be brought out by and through the feminine as she is “the 
sex which is not one.” This is an important metaphor to understand Irigaray’s 
analysis. While the feminine is conceived within its subjugation to the masculine by 
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Western thought and culture, Irigaray argues that the female sexuality, imaginary, 
and language (which constitute the feminine in its multiplicity) are totally different 
and cannot be understood by their similarity to or distance from the phallic One.  
 
Irigaray’s controversial reference here is the female body, particularly the female 
anatomy. She insists on the anatomical difference of female genitals: “…her genitals 
are formed of two lips […] within herself she is already two—but not divisible into 
one(s)—that caress each other” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 24). The anatomical and 
morphological multiplicity of the female genitals brings out a different conception of 
the body that exists in its multiplicity. And this multiplicity is a real multiplicity in 
which the ones forming the two are not identical and not one, hence Irigaray’s title, 
“this sex which is not one”. 
 
The female body does not have single sexual organ but has many, “more or less 
everywhere” on her body. “She has at least two of them, but they are not identifiable 
as ones. Indeed, she has many more. Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even 
further: it is plural” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 28). Thus, neither the autoeroticism nor the 
heteroeroticism of female body can be reduced to one, as it is in the masculine 
imaginary which is “rather too narrowly focused on sameness” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 
28).  
 
Most importantly, female sexuality, imaginary and language cannot be conceived by 
the logic of phallogocentrism which is based on “the predominance of the visual, and 
of the discrimination and individualization of form” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 25). This 
visual or “gestalt” aspect seems to be foreign to the feminine “which is not one.” 
 69 
Irigaray thus defines her philosophical task as that of producing a style of writing 
which is based on these fundamental anatomical features of the female body.  
 
3.2.2. Irigaray’s Style 
 
Is it possible to read and write in a feminine style in a world that has been established 
in phallomorphic form and in phallocratic institutionalization? Although it seems 
somehow paradoxical, Irigaray argues that she can (re)produce a feminine style only 
by staying within the phallomorphic form and phallocratic institutionalization of 
Western metaphysics and language. Hence, she employs a style of deconstructive 
reading and writing, similar to Jacques Derrida’s. Whitford describes this style as 
“homeopathic.” In her words, both Derrida and Irigaray “operate within what they 
are seeking to contest, and accept that there is no position outside metaphysics or 
language from which to disrupt metaphysics or language” (Whitford, 1994, p. 17). 
Irigaray explains her own homeopathic position as follows:  
 
We do not escape, in particular, by thinking we can dispense with a 
rigorous interpretation of phallogocentrism. There is no simple, 
manageable way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any 
possible way to situate oneself there, that would result from the simple 
fact of being a woman (Irigaray, 1985, p. 162). 
 
Here it should be emphasized that Irigaray does not merely repeat Derrida’s strategy 
of deconstruction, but she employs it as a critical device. Whitford is keen on the 
precise nature of this relationship, and, against the more common opinion on 
Irigaray’s debt to Derrida, she argues that what must be acknowledged is indeed 
Derrida’s debt to feminism.29 She says that 
                                                 
29 Whitford (1994) emphasizes that, “most discussions of Derrida and Irigaray focus on Irigaray’s debt 
to Derrida; a question that has not really been raised yet is that of Derrida’s debt to feminist thought. 
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Derrida’s tactic, destabilizing the metaphysical opposition by privileging 
the hierarchically inferior term, can be compared with Irigaray’s claim in 
This Sex Which Is Not One that “one must assume the feminine role 
deliberately” (Whitford, 1994, p. 16).   
 
How can one destabilize or deconstruct metaphysics while staying within it? We 
need to ask: how can Irigaray break with phallogocentrism while working within the 
phallomorphic text? Starting from the vulvomorphic nature of woman’s anatomy, 
Irigaray aims to use the potential multiplicity of the feminine imaginary to disrupt, 
discontinue and subvert the holistically enclosed world of phallogocentrism. For her, 
the opposition of mind and body is definitively involved in the construction of 
patriarchal culture, as man is always identified with mind, reason and consciousness. 
She thus takes this opposition as a strategic beginning point. Departing from this 
opposition, her purpose is producing a vulvomorphic logic which involves the 
“female body” of a different thinking, seeing, and meaning, which is also a thinking, 
seeing and meaning of difference. Here, there are two critical points. First of all, the 
vulvomorphic logic should not end up again with “the hegemony of the One.” In 
other words, simply changing the positions of male and female, and making the 
female the dominant term does not bring any opening. This will only reproduce the 
phallogocentric thought under the disguise of vulvocentrism. Irigaray never attempts 
to construct a vulvocentric thought which is a mere replica of phallogocentric 
thought in reverse. She resolves the problematic of the hegemony of the One by 
constituting the vulvomorphic logic through exposing and explaining the multiple 
nature of female anatomy. Hence, she develops a writing style that also shows a 
characteristic multiplicity. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
[…] There is certainly much more to be said on this issue, and the Derrida-Irigaray relation clearly 
needs exploring more closely.” (p. 17)   
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Secondly, a logic taking the female anatomy as its initial mo(ve)ment should not fall 
back into an anatomical or biological essentialism. From the very beginning, Irigaray 
has been accused of this kind of essentialism. For example, Monique Plaza, Ann 
Rosalind Jones and Toril Moi, who are “for the most part (though not exclusively) 
socialist feminists,” criticized Irigaray’s early writings for biological essentialism 
(Schor, 1994, p. 5). Indeed, the beginning of the 1980s was dominated by the 
“essentialism vs. anti-essentialism” debate in academic circles. The interpretation of 
Irigaray has gone through a deadlock period because of this debate. This deadlock 
period of monolithic essentialist readings of Irigaray, by a wide range of theoretical 
and political spectrum (from Lacanian feminists to socialist/materialist feminists)30, 
has nevertheless brought an opening: “a climate in which the binary pair 
essentialism/anti-essentialism has been put into question” (Whitford, 1994, p. 16). In 
general, essentialism has increasingly been interpreted as a “position” rather than an 
ontology, and in particular, Irigaray’s biological or anatomical essentialism as the 
difference of the feminine has gradually been interpreted as a “strategy”. Within her 
project of constructing a new symbolic order out of a patriarchal one, in which 
women are to become subjects in the symbolic, essentialism is increasingly 
conceived as an obligatory stage that Irigaray suggests one must pass through and go 
beyond. On this point, for instance Schor agrees with Whitford: “The major 
misreading of Irigaray, according to Whitford, consists then in taking her 
essentialism for the final stage, the last word, when it is only a part of process” 
(Schor, 1994, p. 12). In addition to Schor and Whitford, Gallop (1988) also argues 
that 
 
                                                 
30 In her essay “Previous Engagements,” Naomi Schor makes a list of the accusations of essentialism 
that came from various different theoretical and political circles (Schor, 1994, 6-10).  
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… she [Irigaray] is not trapped in the body but uses anatomical figures to 
renew thought, to move it out of its ideological ruts. The tendency to 
dismiss Irigaray as trapped in biologism bespeaks the split which makes 
us suspect that any sustained attention to the body must fall outside the 
bounds of serious thought (p. 8). 
 
The essentialist reception of Irigaray brought a second opening. As Whitford states, 
“greater attention is now being paid to the status of Irigaray’s writing as text, that is 
to say, writing that employs rhetorical devices and strategies” (Whitford, 1994, p. 
16). Irigaray overcomes the problem of essentialism by appealing to figures of 
speech. In other words, her strategy of nesting in the language comes out by 
involving her speech in a process of re-metaphorizing the body.  
 
She utilizes and shares “the style of writing and speech,” which has evolved since 
Hegel as “a style that comes close to that of tragedy, poetry, the Platonic dialogues, 
the way in which myth, parables, and liturgies are expressed” (Schor, 1994, p. 4). 
Here, the paradox is that this return to originary forms in philosophers’ styles of 
writing has involved “a return to the moment at which male identity is constituted 
itself as patriarchal and phallocratic” (Schor, 1994, p. 4). Irigaray’s homeopathic 
manoeuvre here is that she puts into operation the strategy of mimicry in the style of 
writing but her style flows totally towards another course called “the poetics of the 
body”. She puts the aim in/of her style as follows:  
  
The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would 
be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery 
itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of a 
meaning that are excessively univocal (Irigaray, 1985, p. 78).  
 
In this poetics of the body, Irigaray’s writing involves a process of re-metaphorizing 
the body. Jane Gallop (1988) claims that the Irigarayan poetics of the body in its 
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“vulvomorphic logic, by newly metaphorizing the body, sets it free, if only 
momentarily” from the straitjacket of phallomorphic meanings (p. 96). In its 
vulvomorphic logic, Irigaray explains her style as follows: “This “style” does not 
privilege sight; instead, it takes each figure back to its source, which is among other 
things tactile” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 79). In this sense, Irigaray’s “rhetorical techniques 
are various and wily and she does not hesitate to mystify, to mislead” (Weed, 1994, 
p. 81). 
 
3.2.3. Adopting Irigaray 
 
Whitford suggests that we should “engage with Irigaray,” which means “opening up 
the possibility of using her work as a feminist resource” in a productive way within 
her texts’ characteristic “multiplicity,” rather than a definitive account of her work in 
a restrictive closure. (Whitford, 1994, p. 15)  
 
My way of engaging with Irigaray is to use her concept of sexual difference and her 
homeopathic approach in a (re)reading and (re)writing of the ultrasound fetal image. 
The aim here is to move this image from a phallomorphic site to a vulvomorphic one. 
I would like to argue however that the fetal image is not simply a belonging or 
property of the female body. Rather the female body is the site in which this image is 
produced: it is carved in, extracted from and inscribed on it. While these 
mo(ve)ments are surely patriarchal within the domain of the medical gaze and the 
social imagery that circumscribes these images in a singular phallomorphic reading, 
a vulvomorphic logic of these images can also be read and mobilized by attending to 
the female body’s difference.  
 74 
 
3.3. Medical Gaze and Female Difference: Foucault’s Genealogy and Irigaray’s 
Deconstruction 
 
I have a twofold task. First, following the Foucauldian approach, I have to develop a 
critical elaboration of the ultrasound fetal image as an instance of modern clinical 
gaze that puts into operation the power/knowledge of modern medicine and 
disciplinary techniques in the obstetrical clinic. Secondly, this critical analysis of the 
ultrasound fetal image should focus on the sexual difference and expose the 
phallomorphic logic of the modern medical gaze. 31 In other words, I need to develop 
a methodological framework which should articulate the Foucauldian and Irigarayan 
theoretical approaches in the singular case of the ultrasound fetal image. 
 
In the obstetrical clinic, the medical gaze is exercised through a technologically 
produced image. The ultrasound fetal examination takes the female body as a volume 
for bringing the medical knowledge by the aid of mapping the inside of it. The 
disciplinary techniques of the obstetrics spatialize the female body in order to 
produce knowledge through an ocular reading of the text of life, which necessarily 
seeks the pathological in this text because of its phallomorphic logic. Although the 
disciplinary techniques are developed to foster life itself, both the ontology and the 
epistemology of the modern medical gaze necessarily looks for the pathological, 
which not only leads to the emergence of the medical sub-discipline fetology, but 
                                                 
31 I should refer here to Jacqueline Rose’s programmatic statement: “there can be no work on the 
image, no challenge to its powers of illusion and address, which does not simultaneously challenge 
the fact of sexual difference” (Rose, 1996, p. 226).  
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also renders the pregnant woman’s body marginal with regard to the fetus placed at 
the center.  
 
Thus, I would like to argue that, while seeking the pathological in the text of life, the 
obstetrics produces a phallocratic framework by taking the fetus as the dominant or 
pivotal figure and the womb merely as the background or the environment. The 
emergence of fetology as a separate discipline reinforces this tendency in a further 
institutionalization and disciplining of this power over life. Thus the female body has 
become the remaining, residual other. This “phallogocularcentric” structure of the 
modern medical gaze can only be overcome by a new framework in which sexual 
difference is taken into account. Irigaray’s approach to sexual difference, which 
emphasizes feminine difference in terms of a plural(izing) female body rather than 
lack of penis or phallus, will help us to re-elaborate the obstetrical clinic and the 
operation of the medical gaze in it. While, in the obstetrics clinic, the opaque inside 
of the female body is illuminated by the light of the medical gaze, which is 
phallocratic in its insistence on pure visibility, I would like to show that this very 
operation is dependent on the female body’s powers of receiving, hosting, making 
live and giving echo to otherness.   
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4. ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE ULTRASOUND FETAL IMAGE 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the ultrasound fetal examination and its output, 
the ultrasound fetal image. Although ultrasound technology is used in many sub-
disciplines of medicine, its most common and popular use is in the obstetrics. 
Different than the other sub-disciplines of medicine (with the exception of 
gynecology), obstetrics focuses exclusively on the female body. In what follows I 
will begin with a definition of obstetrics, i.e. what this discipline involves in medical 
sense.   
 
Secondly I will focus on what I call the obstetricization of the female body. The 
concept of obstetricization has two senses: first, it implies a historical process in 
which the obstetrical apparatus itself is produced, and second it refers to the 
institutionalized process of obstetrical examination of the pregnant woman’s body. In 
terms of its historical sense, the ultrasound apparatus can be taken back to the 
stethoscope as its genealogical precursor. In terms of an institutionally established 
medical process, the “obstetricization” of the female body involves the silent 
patriarchal prescription implied by the masculine standard, since the implicit human 
standard for the medical gaze is the male body. I would like to further argue that the 
female body is also pathologized as an essential characteristic of the obstetrical 
clinical gaze, ultimately under the new sub-discipline fetology.  
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Lastly, I describe the obstetrical clinic as a phallogocularcentric stage set-up in 
which the ultrasound fetal image occupies the center. This staging requires that a 
narrative of the ultrasound fetal examination is constructed. This will enable me to 
show how the operation of the obstetrical clinical gaze obliterates the female body 
through fetal images, which are its own inscriptions. Yet, as I will show, the female 
body is hardly passive but it is actually involved in the production of these 
inscriptions.   
 
4.1. Definition of Obstetrics 
 
A long-standing definition of obstetrics is “the branch of medicine concerning the 
care of women during pregnancy, labor and the puerperium” (Rothman, 2000, p. 
112).32 Hence obstetrical activity begins with the confirmation of pregnancy. It lasts 
during the gestation period of the pregnant woman, which is medicalized by the 
obstetrics as the prenatal (or the antenatal) care.33 The summit of the obstetrical 
activity is birth that is medicalized and hospitalized, and the delivery is increasingly 
done with surgical methods. And, finally, after delivery, obstetrics makes the 
diagnosis and treatment of disorders of the female reproductive organs.  
 
Obstetrics is a medical and surgical specialty that initiates itself by scientifically 
confirming the pregnancy by reliable laboratory tests, or alternatively, with the visual 
reproduction of the embryonic/fetal image in ultrasound examination. Presently the 
latter is a more popular method. The confirmation is followed by the prenatal care. 
                                                 
32 I must add two other dimensions. First, the scope of obstetrics also includes the abortion. Secondly, 
with gynecology, obstetrics deals with the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.  
33 Ann Oakley (1986) mentions that, “in some European languages (including Finnish, Danish, 
Norwegian, Swedish and Dutch), the term for antenatal care uses the word ‘control’: this can scarcely 
be irrelevant” (p. 2). 
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During the routine obstetrical examinations in this period, the female body is put 
under strict medical surveillance. The main strategy in establishing the prenatal care 
on the female body reveals itself here by the obstetrical claim “to know what is going 
on inside the uterus better than the pregnant woman herself” (Oakley, 1986, p.  27). 
At this stage, ultrasound imaging appears as the most important medical means of 
knowledge and control because it enables obstetrician to map the opaque female 
body by visualizing the uterus and the fetus. In the prenatal care, the female body is 
also governed by the obstetrics through several means: regulating the diet, organizing 
the life-style, and changing habits, etc. Later, the delivery is either made naturally 
under the guidance or control of the obstetrician or made as a surgical operation. 
After birth, obstetrics continues the diagnosis and treatment of the reproductive 
organs in order to ensure the health and fertility of the female body.34 
 
4.2. Obstetricization of the Female Body 
 
There are mainly two stages in the history of the obstetricization of the female body. 
First, pregnancy was incorporated into the medical discourse and practice as a 
‘natural’ state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Secondly, beginning with 
the nineteenth century, it was re-defined as pathology (Oakley, 1986, p. 12). Hence 
the history of obstetrics is not merely a medicalization, but also an increasing 
pathologization of the procreative potential of the female body.  
 
                                                 
34  Within the scope of this thesis, I will deal mainly with the obstetrical activity of prenatal care in 
which ultrasound fetal imaging is mostly used. 
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4.2.1. A Brief History of the Modern Obstetrics 
 
Before the emergence of the modern clinic in Foucault’s sense, pregnancy was seen 
as a “natural” state of the reproductive potential of the female body. As it was a 
natural state, there was no need for routine medical supervision. In the early modern 
hospitals, there was no department specialized in pregnancy. And there was no 
profession (hence professional) claiming the care of the pregnant woman as an expert 
territory (Oakley, 1986, pp. 11-12). Hence, “the first and most fundamental notion 
was that pregnancy itself was not a disease” for medicine (Oakley, 1986, p. 14). In 
traditional societies, the pregnancy was under the control of women themselves. 
Specialized women, mostly old women called “midwives” took care of the childbirth 
and helped the delivery. The process itself was customary and should be considered 
as a good example of what Foucault called “popular knowledge.”35 
 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pregnancy was incorporated into the 
medical discourse as a natural state. “A substantial corpus of medical advice 
literature for pregnant women” was in existence by the end of the nineteenth century 
(Oakley, 1986, p. 12).36 This literature consisted of advices mostly on the diet, 
habits, life-styles, i.e. the experience of pregnancy. In addition to this advice 
literature, there were only a few therapies practiced, such as bloodletting and a few 
monitoring techniques, such as abdominal palpation (Oakley, 1986, p. 25).  
 
                                                 
35 “... popular knowledge (le savoir des gens) though it is far from being a general commonsense 
knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge 
incapable of unanimity” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 82). 
36 Oakley (1986) adds that, “there was also a more narrow, but overlapping, corpus of professional 
literature dealing with pregnancy” at the same era (p. 12). 
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On the one hand, “the early literature on pregnancy made no separation between 
obstetric texts and the ‘advice’ literature” (Oakley, 1986, p. 14). On the other, while 
providing information in these books, the authors made a systematization of the 
everyday experience of pregnant women. “Thus systematized, this experience then 
came to be represented as technical-medical knowledge” (Oakley, 1986, p. 14). This 
stage might be seen as the beginning period of the modern medical power-knowledge 
whose ultimate rationale would be governing the pregnant body.  
 
There were still some obstacles in front of the emergence and development of the 
modern obstetrics. The most significant of these obstacles was the scientific 
diagnosis of pregnancy accurately. Unless pregnancy could be diagnosed relatively 
accurately and early, obstetrics would be limited to little more than a last-minute 
preparation for labor. This would be accomplished in 1920s by reliable laboratory 
tests (Oakley, 1986, p. 17). But real progress in modern medicine came out with the 
shift in medical paradigm and discourse, which stimulated the second stage in the 
medicalization of pregnancy, i.e. the birth of the modern obstetrics.  
 
In order for the obstetrics appear, there must have occurred a paradigm shift in the 
way the disease is conceived. This is the moment of the emergence of the concept of 
pathological life. The medicine was wholly re-ordered in accordance with the 
pathological anatomy. In the new clinical method, the anatomo-pathologists 
discovered “a non-philosophy, or abolished philosophy, that they had conquered in 
learning at last to perceive” (Foucault, 1991, p. 155, emphasis mine). The medical 
gaze was divorced from theory and was constituted and institutionalized as a 
complex apparatus of observation and perception in which the touch and the hearing 
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as well as the gaze are involved. The new medicine saw the disease and the morbid 
phenomena as a natural part of the text of life, rather than something attacking the 
body from the outside. The text of life inscribed in the body became readable by the 
medical gaze. Thus modern clinical medicine is established on the project of 
rendering the body transparent and getting beyond its surface by making the invisible 
inside visible and thus governing the body in a much more effective way.  
 
Parallel to all these developments in medicine in the nineteenth century, pregnancy 
was redefined as pathology rather than being natural. Thus the modern obstetrics 
emerged as a medical profession and “obstetrical” clinic was institutionalized under 
the reign of a new form of medical gaze, i.e. the obstetrical gaze. All medical 
technology in the obstetrical clinic was designed to render the female body 
transparent, which would bring out the scientific “truth” through obstetrical gaze. To 
foster life, obstetrical gaze should not only define the normal and the pathological 
but also govern the female body by disciplinary techniques in order to make it more 
useful, productive and docile parallel to the public health movement and population 
control in this period. The routine examination designed for this was called “prenatal 
care.” The medical instruments such as stethoscope and specula and later the medical 
imaging apparatuses such as X-ray and ultrasound were given to the service of the 
obstetrical gaze. The hospital was re-organized not only in spatial terms but also 
clinics were institutionalized in which obstetrics took its place. In all this modern 
progress, the female body appeared as the object on which obstetrical disciplinary 
and regulatory powers are exercised on both individual and social levels.   
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I now want to turn to the concept of the anatomo-pathological as it appears in the 
history of obstetrics, that is to say the gradual pathologization of the female body and 
its procreative potential.  
 
4.2.2. The Concept of the “Anatomo-pathological” in the History of Modern 
Obstetrics 
 
In modern medicine, the female body is conceptualized and constructed on the basis 
of male parameters. With the development of anatomy, the male body is taken as the 
scientific ‘standard.’ Hence the female anatomy is seen as a deviance from the male 
one. In other words, the female anatomy could be represented only with its 
difference from the anatomic form of the male body, i.e. the reproductive and genital 
organs.  
 
A certain regime of visibility and visuality plays a central role here. Since this 
regime depends on the visibility of the male genitals in opposition to the invisible, 
dark nature of the female genitals, I will call it “phallomorphism.” Phallomorphism 
operates within the logic of specular comparison of the dominant with the 
subordinate figure as binary opposites. It is a scopic and specular regime that 
depends on a privileging of the visible. Hence, in phallomorphic logic, the 
subordinate figure is always defined by the characteristics of the dominant one. 
Modern medical apparatus is phallomorphic in its assumption of the male anatomy as 
the standard human figure. In modern medical system of representation, the female 
body can only take place by the difference of its genital and reproductive organs—a 
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difference that is conceived in comparative terms of similarity and is often reduced 
to absence or lack of parts or organs visibly seen in the standard male form.   
 
In this phallomorphic regime, the female body can at best be represented partially in 
the anatomical atlases. This is still relevant for the medical education today. Lupton 
(1995) states that the “contemporary anatomy textbooks designed for medical 
students still tend to portray the male body as the standard human body, against 
which the ‘different’ female body is compared” (p. 132). And the phallomorphic 
logic of the modern medicine (as well as of the society) presents itself discursively in 
these textbooks “while comparative references to female anatomy make constant use 
of the terms ‘smaller’, ‘feebler’, ‘weaker’ or ‘less developed’ to demonstrate how 
women differ from men” (Lupton, 1995, p. 132).37 Obstetrics maintains the 
phallomorphic concept of human body. 
 
The phallocratic society legitimizes itself by presenting the different anatomical and 
biological structure of the female body as responsible for the weakness, emotional 
nature and lack of rationality of feminine subjectivity. The menstruation, female 
hormones and the reproductive potential of women are seen legitimate reasons to 
define their social status in domestic work as well as in the social division of labor 
and even ‘enthroned’ by the ‘holy’ social role of being mother. Parallel to this 
phallocratic institutionalization of social relations, women have always been kept out 
of the modern scientific field in the history of modern medicine, like many other 
professional fields. They have been seen as the practitioners of traditional medicine 
                                                 
37 Phallomorphic logic not only reigns in medicine but also in his psychoanalytic theory, as in Lacan’s 
acceptance of the clitoris as a “little penis”. 
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(which has mostly been equated with witchcraft38) or, at most, at a secondary level in 
modern medicine, such as midwives and nurses. As Turner (1995) states, even today 
“within the division of labor in medical services, women continue to function as 
subordinate labor and this feature of female employment in medicine is forcefully 
illustrated by the case of nursing and midwifery” (p. 131). 
 
In the history of medicine in Europe, by the fourteenth century, the women healers 
were excluded from medical practice “except for obstetrics, which remained the 
province of female midwifes even among the upper classes” (Ehrenreich and 
English, 1973, p. 19). At the end of this century, midwifery started to be subject to 
regulation and “by the mid-eighteenth century women began to be required to have 
some formal training, lasting anywhere from a few months to two years, in schools 
associated with either a university or a hospital” on midwifery (Newman, 1996, p. 
51). In the same period, the discipline of anatomy began to consider the body as a 
series of parts to be manipulated under the scrutiny of clinical gaze, which is 
established on the phallomorphic logic. At the same time, the obstetrics became 
increasingly technologized. Forceps, more elaborate pelvimeters and specula were 
invented and manufactured. Therefore obstetrics not only became a male profession 
under the phallomorphic anatomo-clinical gaze but also midwives were legally 
barred from surgical practice because of the patriarchal belief that women are 
technically inferior in the use of surgical devices (Ehrenreich and English, 1973, pp. 
15-20). An illustration showing the differences between a male and female midwife 
from the phallocratic point of view exposes all these phenomena explicitly (Fig. 4.1). 
                                                 
38 For a brief history of the accusation of the women healers as witches in medieval Europe, see 
Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English’s pamphlet Witches, Midwives, and Nurses: A History of 
Women Healers. 
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Thus, “obstetrics became professionalized and, ultimately, the province of men, 
especially among urban elites” (Newman, 1996, p. 51).  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Frontispiece of S. W. Fores, Man-Midwifery Dissected, 1793  
(Newman, 1996, p. 48). 
 
 
 
4.2.3. The Stethoscope and the Ultrasound 
 
The emergence and historical development of the anatomo-pathological gaze can 
also be read in terms of the invention of medical technology as extensions of the 
body of the medical apparatus. I have already referred to the new methods of seeing, 
hearing and touching which constituted the medical gaze. These new methods 
offered a projective reading of the lesional signs and managed to locate the disease 
within the body of the patient. According to Oakley (1986), as “… obstetricians and 
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gynaecologists have observed, the commonest abdominal tumour in women is 
pregnancy” (p. 159). This is an early expression of how women’s body is entirely 
pathologized by modern medicine. Hence signs projected an anatomo-pathological 
series upon the living body. The task was now analyzing the series and mapping the 
volume of the body. The invention of the stethoscope was of prime significance in 
this process:    
 
The stethoscope, the solidified distance, transmits profound and invisible 
events along a semi-tactile, semi-auditory axis. Instrumental mediation 
outside the body authorizes a withdrawal that measures the moral 
distance involved; the prohibition of physical contact makes it possible to 
fix the virtual image of what is occurring well below the visible area. For 
the hidden, the distance of shame is a projection screen. What one cannot 
see is shown in the distance from what one must not see (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 164).  
 
The word “gaze” began to refer to a complex sensorial field, which Foucault 
describes as a new perceptual configuration defined by the sight/touch/hearing 
trinity: “the inaccessible illness is tracked down by markers, gauged in depth, drawn 
to the surface, and projected virtually on the dispersed organs of the corpse” 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 164). As I have already argued in the third chapter, the new 
organization made it possible to locate the invisible spatially. According to Foucault, 
“the medical gaze is now endowed with a plurisensorial structure. A gaze that 
touches, hears, and, moreover, not by essence or necessity, sees” (Foucault, 1991, p. 
164). 
 
Although touch and hearing are involved, Foucault talks of the medical gaze: since 
what is involved is below the threshold of visibility, the gaze becomes a virtual gaze 
by the inclusion of touch and hearing. But this also implies that the privilege of the 
gaze or of the visible depends on a complex process which is witness to, first, the 
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inclusion of touch and hearing, and then the homogenization of this sensorial 
complexity. This is the process in which the medical gaze becomes hegemonic and is 
regarded as a gaze purified from theory. This is immediately related to the role of 
language in Foucault’s analysis: as soon as the hegemony of the gaze over the other 
senses is established, medical discourse begins to produce its statements. I would like 
to argue that this hegemony of the medical gaze is in conformity with the 
phallomorphic scopic regime which operates by the principle of the visible unity of a 
form based on the conceptual model of Phallic One. In other words, the senses under 
the homogenizing attempt and dictation of gaze are made to operate in a 
phallomorphic regime and produce the intelligibility of new objects in masculine 
parameters. There is thus already a masculine matrix embedded in the very operation 
of the anatomo-pathological, and by implication the obstetrical gaze.    
 
The use of stethoscope in obstetrics is more than an instrumental mediation 
necessary for the virtual medical gaze but it also provides the required “moral 
distance” while, as Foucault (1991) says, “fixing the virtual image of what is 
occurring well below the visible area” (p. 164). Therefore, phallomorphic scopic 
regime of the obstetrical gaze also ensures the phallocratic moral values. Oakley 
(1986) gives a remarkable historical instance of this moral distance enabled by the 
use of stethoscope in obstetrics from the Victorian period. 
 
In a fierce debate with the Master of the Rotunda Hospital, Robert 
Collins, in the 1830s, Hamilton asked if Collins would ‘propose to apply 
the stethoscope to the naked belly of a woman, for if so, he may be 
assured that in this part of the world at least (implies Britain), such a 
proposal would be indignantly rejected by every … practitioner of 
reputed respectability’ (p. 26).  
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In the necessity of this phallocratic moral distance, abdominal and vaginal 
examinations operated by sight and touch of the obstetrician were also problematic. 
Oakley (1986) states that, in the nineteenth century “even abdominal examinations in 
pregnancy were considered highly improper. When abdominal examination was 
done, it was normally conducted under the bedclothes and with the examiner’s eyes 
on the ceiling” (p. 19) as it is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. Despite this initial resistance, the 
stethoscope provided the physician precisely with this kind of moral distance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Gynecological Examination (Ehrenreich and English, 1973, p. 25). 
 
 
 
Today, often characterized as a “non-invasive” technology, the ultrasound imaging is 
an advanced instance of the instrumental mediation that provides the required moral 
distance while, again, “fixing the virtual image of what is occurring well below the 
visible area” in Foucault’s well-known description of its predecessor, the stethoscope 
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(Foucault, 1991, p. 164). The ultrasound apparatus not only takes away the direct 
contact with the female body, but also ensures the obstetrical gaze to operate on the 
female body by producing the uterus and the fetus as visible and manipulable 
objects. Hence, the obstetrician has the scientific specular evidence of his major 
claim that he knows what is going on inside the uterus better than the pregnant 
woman. Thus, with the ultrasound imaging, the obstetrical power/knowledge reached 
a certain threshold: “it is now possible to make direct contact with the fetus, and 
acquire a detailed knowledge of her or his physiology” (Oakley, 1986, p. 155). 
 
4.2.4. The Obstetrical Gaze and Ultrasound Imaging  
 
The modern era of obstetrics really began with the invention of ultrasound imaging 
technology and its adoption to obstetrics for seeing the inside of the uterus. This gave 
the medical apparatus an increased capacity of controlling and governing the process 
of pregnancy under the concept of prenatal care. 
 
Indeed, this was an expansion of the powers of medical gaze. Before, the medical 
gaze operated by translating and transforming the data gathered by auditory and 
tactile senses and devices from the surface of the opaque body, in conjunction with 
the anatomical knowledge that is accumulated from the dissection of the corpses and 
projected on to the body. With the invention of X-ray, for the first time, the medical 
gaze could penetrate into the opaque mass of the body non-invasively and expanded 
its territory by making it transparent. Thus, the body not only became transparent but 
the still images of its interiority became reproducible. X-ray technology started to be 
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used by obstetrics, within a few years after its invention,39 for the diagnosis of 
pregnancy and the measurement of the growth and normality of the fetus (Oakley, 
1994, p. 193). In the mid-1950s, with the scientific research proving the long-term 
hazards of X-ray, the use of X-ray in obstetrics began to decline. It would soon be 
replaced by the use of the ultrasound.40  
 
The invention of electronic medical imaging technologies such as ultrasound 
signified the second breakthrough in the expansion of medical gaze. As Kember 
(1995) states, “the body can now be anatomized ‘live’ and functioning because the 
process of imaging can replace the practice of dissection in the search for medical 
knowledge” (p. 100). Therefore, starting from the 1960s, ultrasound technology is 
adopted to obstetrics and used in the clinic not only for the diagnostic examination of 
pregnancy but also in the treatment of pregnancy by seeking the potential pathology 
in the pregnant woman’s body as well as the body of the fetus. While ultrasound 
imaging enlarged obstetrical corpus of knowledge by extending possibility of 
observation, measurement and calculation, obstetrics legitimized itself in governing 
the female body in and by disciplinary techniques. 
 
Thus, in the second half of the twentieth century, ultrasound imaging was identified 
with the obstetrical clinic and had a number of significant consequences for 
obstetrics. First, the era of pathological redefinition of pregnancy process reached its 
summit: The obstetrical ultrasound imaging enabled to seek the pathological in the 
pregnant women’s body, and thus making the pregnancy a pathological process and 
                                                 
39 Oakley (1986) states that “the first X-ray of a pregnant woman (with a dead fetus) was performed 
by E. P. Darts and W. W. Keen of Philadelphia, in 1896” (p. 28). 
40 Oakley (1994) does not think that “it is mere coincidence that the use of X-rays in obstetrics 
declined rapidly in the late 1950s—which was also the time at which the pioneering work on obstetric 
ultrasound was done” (p. 195).  
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the female body as the site/text of pathology. Second, a conceptual differentiation of 
‘normal’ from ‘abnormal’ pregnancy became central to the obstetrical discourse 
(Oakley, 1986, p. 16). Third, as William Arney states, not only the “organizing 
concept in obstetrics changed from ‘confinement’ to ‘surveillance,’” but “the 
hospital became the center of a system (of) obstetrical surveillance that extended 
throughout the community” as well (qtd. in Balsamo, 1996, p. 89). Fourth, the range 
of the professional authority of the obstetrician expanded to include the 
responsibilities for interpreting the obstetrical ultrasound images (Balsamo, 1996, p. 
90). The obstetricians had to get new certificates or licenses that approved their right 
to use obstetrical ultrasound apparatus and capability of interpreting the ultrasound 
images. And finally, there appeared the live images of a new body inside the 
pregnant woman’s body, i.e. the fetus, to watch, to put under surveillance and 
control. This last consequence of the expansion of the ultrasound imaging in the 
obstetrical clinic led “some obstetricians to claim that the fetus is actually the 
primary obstetrics patient” (Balsamo, 1996, p. 90). This finally led to the emergence 
of a new obstetrical sub-discipline called fetology. 
 
4.2.5. Fetology 
 
Today, the ultimate instance of the obstetricization of the female body should be 
regarded as fetology. The obstetrical clinical gaze takes the uterus as the central 
organ, which is surrounded by other reproductive organs, i.e. ovaries, fallopian tubes, 
cervix and vagina. However, from the very beginning, the medical representation of  
 92 
this central organ has always been occupied by another figure: the fetus.41 Hence, for 
the obstetrical operation of the clinical gaze, it has been primary and necessary to 
render the uterus transparent for being able to reach the fetus. 
 
The scientific scope of obstetrics is initiated with the diagnosis of the pregnancy, i.e. 
the formation of the embryo/fetus. The obstetrical process per se, i.e. the prenatal 
care begins as soon as the form of embryo or fetus is identified. According to 
Rothman (2000), the medical model of pregnancy tends to conceive the relationship 
between the pregnant woman and the fetus as “as essentially parasitic and vaguely 
pathological” (p. 112). Obstetrics perceives the pregnant woman and the fetus as two 
separate patients and defines “pregnancy as inherently a conflict of interests between 
the two” in which “the fetus is highly valued” (Rothman, 2000, p. 112).42 Therefore, 
the obstetrician mostly focuses on the fetal image in routine ultrasound examinations 
during the prenatal period.  
 
In search of the anatomo-clinical sign, the doctor traverses the body of the fetus, i.e. 
the visual text it provides, and records its age, weight, the size of its “head” 
(ultrasonic cephalometry), or of its “nose” and “nasal structure”, as well as expected 
date of delivery. Various other measurements take an extensive record of the body in 
search of possible pathology—the doctors can detect heart or kidney failures. Lisa 
Mitchell (2001) shows that “claims about what can be seen through this window are 
numerous: the state of fetal anatomy, fetal growth and development, hundreds of 
fetal pathologies, fetal sex as early as eleven weeks, and fetal sleep, rest and activity 
                                                 
41 Look at the anatomical and obstetrical illustrations and models in chapter two. 
42 Rothman (2000) gives an instance of this phenomenon by a quotation from the classic obstetrical 
textbook Williams Obstetrics as follows: “the fetus has rightfully achieved the status of second 
patient, a patient who usually faces much greater risk of serious morbidity and mortality than does the 
mother” (p. 113). 
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patterns”; some go as far as “witnessing fetal masturbation” and observing “enough 
fetal behaviour” to begin the practice of “fetal psychoanalysis”  (p. 4). This goes as 
far as the possibility of fetal surgery inside the womb. By taking the medical fantasy 
of controlling the deviations and singularities of body to its very process of 
emergence and formation, the fetology begins to treat the fetus as a patient, and 
hence a small human that is not yet out of her mother’s womb, but in a sense already 
formed there. The fetus is constructed as the originary form of the human subject. 
But this is not merely a question of ideology. The role of the medical, scientific text 
cannot be underestimated. The image is individualized as soon as the visual text and 
data are available: a case and a file is made before the baby is officially born. Hence, 
de facto, birth becomes a mere change of place. “The fetus is thus an unborn 
patient/individual, or is treated as one, with its own singularities and deviations. If 
Foucault showed in Disicipline and Punish that modern individual is produced by 
disciplinary technologies, i.e. almost by definition pathological or abnormal, we must 
say that this disciplinary production is now taken to the time before the official birth 
of the individual” (Mutman and Ocak, 2008, p. 25).  
 
One of the major premises of obstetrics is that every aspect of both the pregnant 
woman and the fetus is potentially important. However, as implicitly stated above, 
obstetrics is more inclined to develop observation, measurement and calculation 
about the fetus since the technology of the ultrasound foregrounds the fetus as the 
very figure in focus. In addition, in the obstetrical ultrasound session, while the fetal 
form is totally put under surveillance and control, the pregnant woman’s body is 
examined partially, mostly limited to her uterus. Therefore, the primary patient under 
care becomes the fetus. Here, the limitation is established on the basis of the 
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phallomorphic operation of obstetrical gaze, which involves the technological 
operation as well. Fetus is given a form, individualized as such by the obstetrical 
gaze. The result is obstetric dispensing “with the mothers as intermediaries, as 
necessary informants on fetal status and life-style” (Oakley, 1986, p. 157). In a sense, 
the ultrasound imaging process obliterates the pregnant woman’s body from view not 
only with the fetal image almost totally occupying the ultrasound monitor but also 
with the phallomorphic virtual accomplishment of the obstetrical relation between 
the obstetrician and the fetal form/image. Treichler (1990) shows that, in the case of 
the United States, fetology appeared as a medical reaction to the women’s challenge 
to the medical model of childbirth. According to her, “... most U.S. medical 
discourse focuses on the act of the fetuses alone, and further represents it as an act in 
which the physician’s presence is crucial. Indeed, in some obstetrics and gynecology 
textbooks the woman is erased altogether” (p. 122). This erasure of woman’s body 
from the process of childbirth is a male medical fantasy of unmediated access to the 
body, made possible by the specific institutionalization of ultrasound technology.   
 
The disciplinary production of the individual taken to the time before birth (in 
Foucault’s sense) and the phallomorphic establishment of the obstetrical gaze (in 
Irigaray’s sense) work in a complementary way to legitimize a fetal personhood with 
its pathologies, its individuality and its rights. While some obstetricians see 
themselves on the side of the fetus as their primary patient in a fetological 
understanding43, some others “see themselves as the arbiters between the two parties 
in the presumed conflict (…) between a woman and her fetus” (Rothman, 2000, p. 
                                                 
43 Balsamo (1996) states that “pprotection of the fetus is often offered as a commonsensical and, 
hence, ideological rationale for intervention into a woman’s pregnancy, either through the actual 
application of invasive technologies or through the exercise of technologies of social monitoring and 
surveillance” (p. 89). 
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110). However, in both positions, the pathological understanding of pregnancy is 
maintained and it not only produces a fetal personhood but also obliterates the 
pregnant woman’s body in the ultrasound examination. For both positions sustain the 
same medical, institutional and technological process of prenatal care. 
 
4.3. The Scene of the Body: Obstetrics as “Phallogocularcentrism”  
 
So far I have talked about the emergence and development of the obstetrical gaze as 
a version of the medical gaze. Now I would like to turn to the scene itself, the 
examination room, and to offer a critical reading of it as a particular form of staging 
of the human body, which I will call “phallogocularcentric.” 
 
4.3.1. Ultrasound Fetal Examination in the Obstetrical Clinic 
 
The ultrasound fetal examination is not a merely medical practice, but a social 
practice that has increasingly gained a ritual character. In what follows I will give a 
straightforward description of the process itself. The process begins with the 
pregnant woman’s visit to the doctor, usually with her partner. The ultrasound 
apparatus stands in the centre of the examination room with a gynecological table 
next to it. The process involves a kind of micro-hospitalization: there is a dressing 
cabinet for the pregnant woman to take off her clothes and wear a hygienic medical 
dress. When she is ready, the obstetrician asks her to lie down on the gynecological 
table and uncover her belly. After squirting the pregnant woman’s belly with a cool 
blue gel, the obstetrician sits down in front of the ultrasound apparatus. The pregnant 
woman lies perpendicular to the obstetrician and the partner of the pregnant woman 
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stands up in a position where he can see the monitor. The monitor is half turned to 
the pregnant woman. Hence, the positions of the obstetrician, pregnant woman and 
her partner are all organized with regard to the screen of the monitor. Each one has 
his/her visual access to the screen. The light of the room is dimmed. When the 
obstetrician moves the probe of the apparatus (which is linked to it with a cord) on 
the abdominal surface of the pregnant woman, a grayish, arc-shaped image appears 
on the luminescent screen of the monitor. That is the ultrasound image. 
 
The obstetrician moves the probe on the abdominal surface and taps on the keyboard 
of the apparatus with his/her other hand. Fully focused on the image in motion on the 
luminescent screen, the obstetrician captures the ‘right’ fetal position and freezes a 
‘proper’ still-image of the fetus. If the fetus is not in an appropriate position, he/she 
taps gently on the belly of the pregnant woman to stimulate the fetus to change its 
position in order to get a proper fetal image. Then, carefully observing the image, 
he/she begins to make measurements and calculations on this fetal still-image by 
using the apparatus. These are dictated to a nurse who takes record. During this 
process, there is no conversation between the physician and the pregnant woman. 
The obstetrician’s sole focus is the image on the screen while dictating the medical 
information in purely technical and medical language, with corresponding values and 
numbers. The nurse writes down every term and value into the file of the pregnant 
woman.44  
 
                                                 
44 In addition to the morphology of the fetus, echography apparatus can reproduce “images of internal 
organs, cross-sections of brain and heart” (Adams, 1994, p. 136). So the development of the fetus can 
be surveiled. The age, length, weight and expected date of delivery can be calculated as an estimation. 
For a detailed explanation on the technical reproduction of ultrasound fetal images see chapter two. 
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During this obstetrical knowledge recording, the couple too attentively look at the 
screen to capture some kind of shape that looks like a baby, and to the words of the 
obstetrician to make some sense. While the obstetrician makes observations, 
measurements, and calculations, the couple also look closely at the face of the 
obstetrician as they are anxious to understand if there is anything wrong in the 
ultrasound fetal image. And, from time to time, the obstetrician may interrupt his/her 
medical speech and turns to the couple to show something on the screen, and explain 
in plain language something of his/her choice. “The couple smile, laugh, and point at 
the screen even though they often do not recognize anything in the blur” (Mitchell, 
2001, p. 3)  (Fig. 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. A couple looking at the fetal image in the obstetrical ultrasound examination 
(Nilsson, 1990, p. 104). 
 
 
 
The ultrasound examination is finished by the obstetrician turning off the machine. 
The light of the examination room is turned on. The obstetrician or the nurse wipes 
away the gel. The woman takes off the hygienic medical dress and puts on her 
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clothes in the dressing cabinet. Before leaving the ultrasound examination room, the 
obstetrician gives a printed still image of the fetus or the video recording of the 
session, known as “Baby’s First Picture” (Figs. 4.4, 4.5) or “Baby’s First Video,” 
respectively (Mitchell, 2001, p. 3).45 These recordings (of whether still or moving 
images) consists internal images of the uterus and the fetus.  
 
4.3.2. Ultrasound Examination as a Phallogocularcentric Stage Set-up 
 
As we have seen above, the fetal image as “originary” human form occupies the 
center scene while the obstetrician constructs a narrative based on the examination of 
this image. I call this form of staging of the fetus “phallogocularcentric”, i.e. phallus-
logos-ocular-centric. This is a particular form of representation or theatrics, in which 
vision and discourse, form and truth, are co-produced in a particular distribution of 
senses and bodies. How can we problematize this particular regime of truth? 
 
If we remember the technical operation of the ultrasound, it begins with the sending 
of inaudible sound waves to the woman’s body, and the body’s echoic response to 
these. Depending on different densities of its tissues, the body gives echoes in 
different intensities, which are then transformed into pixels at varying shades 
allowing the ghostly appearance of forms on the monitor. Offering an expert 
interpretation of the resulting shadowy image, the obstetrician gives a medical 
account of the fetus and uterus. It all seems to depend on the extraction of knowledge  
 
                                                 
45 This still/moving image of the fetus is mostly shown to the relatives and friends with amazement. 
The still image takes its place in the first page of the ‘Baby Album.’ The videotape takes its place 
among the home video recordings. In any case, this image is totally different than other photographs 
and video recordings. 
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Fig. 4.4. Ultrasound embryonic image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5. Ultrasound fetal image. 
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from the body by employing a technological apparatus. But what is it that makes us 
assume that the body is passive in this process? It is our assumption that its echo is 
simply the homogenous repetition of the same sound. That is to say, the assumption 
that the body or matter is mere surface which gives the same sound back. My basic 
thesis depends on a problematization of this assumption. The body does not merely 
respond to a message that is sent to it—neither the woman’s body, nor the body of 
the fetus. The two bodies “reflect” their difference, and the body always reflects and 
resonates a difference for it is not a homogenous surface which simply gives back the 
sounds that hit it. The tissular surface of the body is a differential force field. The 
message that it returns is not the same one that is sent. Once we begin to see the body 
as active in this process, we have a chance to inscribe the (female) difference into the 
medical account. As I will argue in my conclusion, the female body is the home of 
difference. The reason why I describe the obstetrical stage as phallogocularcentric 
(phallus-logos-ocular-centric) is precisely that it depends on a double operation 
which is regarded as natural: by virtue of its appearance as a distinct shape in color 
contrast with and through its environment, the fetus becomes the focus, and the 
woman’s body is thus reduced to a mere environment. This kind of figuring on a 
ground, the production of the fetal gestalt, is constitutive of the obstetrical as well as 
fetological narratives. If we begin to see the body as active however, the present 
obstetrical narrative appears entirely paradoxical: while the visual configuration or 
gestalt was made possible by the echoes that the body produces in response to what it 
receives, the obstetrical reading completely ignores the body as mere surface, frame 
or environment. The obstetrical examination of the pregnant woman is thus 
transformed into an examination of the fetus, which finds its ultimate rationale in 
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fetology. Surely the woman’s body, organs and health are not simply medically 
ignored, but rather that her particular activity is pushed to the background.  
 
There is a teleology at work here. The teleology of forming fetal images, of reaching 
an ultimately visible and intelligible form, makes the heterogeneous inaudible echoes 
of the active (female) body to go under the reign of the obstetrical clinical gaze. 
Hence the regime of the obstetrical gaze operates on the basis of suppressing what is 
absolutely necessary in making the fetus visible and intelligible: the vocal production 
of the tissular, bodily difference. It is not surprising in the end that the woman is 
completely marginalized, her very being treated as surface and environment. As 
Oakley (1994) states, it is the institutional and technical setting itself which produces 
this marginalization, and not any ideological intention or gender bias on the part of 
the doctor: “the obstetrician, who can view an ultrasound scan, or a chart describing 
ultrasonically-surveyed growth, has much less time to spend conversing with the 
owner of the surveyed fetus—the mother. The machine tells the doctor what the 
doctor wants to know” (p. 196). Although this techno-scientific discourse is illegible 
to the pregnant woman and her partner, the doctor does not necessarily have to 
translate it into ordinary language in as much as its sole purpose is reading, recording 
and filing information.  
 
4.3.3. Echo: Science and Allegory  
 
The word “echo,” which means “resonance” in English, comes from ancient Greek 
mythology. According to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Echo is a water nymph, whose 
special gift is storytelling. Her stories were so beautiful that no one could resist 
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listening to her. But Echo was cursed by Jove’s wife Juno, who realized that her 
husband used Echo to keep her busy while he was with his young lover. The curse 
was that Echo could no longer speak unless she was addressed by another. Losing 
her own voice Echo became a body that could only reverberate the sound of another 
person talking to her. She was devastated and spent her days in solitude. Then one 
day she saw Narcissus and instantly fell in love with him. Yet she could not approach 
to him unless he speaks first. She followed him and patiently waited for him to say 
something. When hunting, Narcissus lost his companions, and looking for them, he 
shouted: “is there anybody here?” Echo replied: “Here!” Narcissus responded: “I will 
stay here. You come to me.” Echo repeated again: “Come to me.” Narcissus called 
again, “why do you fly from me?” and Echo replied “fly from me.” Then Narcissus 
said: “come here, let us meet” and Echo resonated: “let us meet” and then 
approached and wanted to embrace him. But Narcissus rejected and shouted: “Hands 
off! Embrace me not! May I die before I give you power over me!” And the nymph 
sadly replied: “I give you power over me.” Broken and humiliated, her body melted 
into the air and her bones turned into stone. Only her echoing voice remained.46 
 
In an essay titled “Echo,” Gayatri Spivak (1993) offers a careful reading of this 
passage in Ovid’s original Latin text. According to her, because of the structure of 
the Latin verb “to fly”, Ovid cannot make Echo repeat exactly the last lines of 
Narcissus’ question “why do you fly from me?” and therefore he has her say instead, 
in an ironically imperative form, “fly from me”!  According to Spivak, this gap is 
Echo’s deconstructive power, her power of differing from Narcissus. It is not for 
nothing that the conventional psychoanalytic theory made Narcissus a central figure: 
                                                 
46 I made this summary by cross-checking several translations of Metamorphoses of Ovid. I utilized 
Mary Mines’s and Ted Hughes’s books, Spivak’s translation in her article “Echo” and Petek’s 
summary of the Echo myth in her article “Narcissus and the Echo at the Movies.”  
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in Freud’s theory of ego, the myth of narcissus has played a constitutive 
metaphorical role, and in Lacan’s theory of mirror stage, one can feel the effect of 
the same myth in Lacan’s emphasis on visuality and Gestalt in the formation of the 
human subject. However Spivak’s argument implies that, while Narcissus has a 
visual double, his reflection in the mirror which is his same, Echo’s doubling is 
reverberation, which is never full, never the same, and admits difference. I have 
described above the surface of the body as a differential force field capable of giving 
a differing response. The allegory itself is an early articulation of the differential, 
non-natural “nature” of nature, of body or matter. It is this differential nature which 
is translated into a visual image by the ultrasound machine. Although the female 
difference is productive and active here, the process silences the very body which 
makes it possible by translating its vocal force into a vision that is kept at a safe 
distance and mastered by the medical apparatus.   
 
Can we apply the allegory of the Echo to the obstetrical narrative? Before the 
pathologization of pregnancy, the woman was able to give a verbal account of her 
experience, to tell her story. With the curse of pathologization, she lost her voice and 
can now only respond to the obstetrician when she is addressed. She was reduced to 
a body under the obstetrical authority. Yet this cannot mean a total obliteration of her 
power. For woman’s difference is what enables the image itself to be produced 
(Narcissus as observer looking at his double, who is fetus as small man). But this 
kind of application is superfluous for its logic depends on a search for 
correspondences or similarities between two systems of signification (scientific and  
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literary). Rather than such a symbolic logic of sameness, I would like to focus on the 
powers of the (female) body as the larger text of life in my concluding chapter.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The phallogocularcentric staging of the ultrasound fetal examination provides a 
visible form. But it is not clear what exactly we see on the screen: is it an embryo, or 
a fetus, or an unborn baby or a small human?  
 
It is not just an image. And it is certainly not a just image. The fetal image has 
exceeded the limits of the obstetrical clinic from the very beginning. Lennart 
Nilsson’s fetal photographs became very popular all around the world and met with 
fascination and astonishment and he soon became an international celebrity. While 
the ultrasound imaging technology made a breakthrough in modern obstetrics and 
legitimized fetology, ultrasound fetal images have been published, broadcast and 
screened in all sorts of media outside their medical context. They are not only 
presented as “the life before birth”, “the beginning of life”, and even “life itself” but 
are also seen as the scientific evidence of the genesis of life. Anti-abortion movement 
(also known as pro-life movement) immensely utilized and abused fetal images. The 
claim of the anti-abortion movement is that the fetal images constitute the scientific 
evidence of fetal personhood. Hence, with the increasing ubiquity of the fetal image 
in the culture at large, it has also emerged as a prime instance of what Michel 
Foucault called “biopolitics.” The result is the vast and heated debate we have today 
on the nature of the fetal image in law, medicine, politics and the media.    
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Here, I would like to argue that “the desire to see the fetus is a singular desire to 
capture the very moment of the birth of the human, or better, the event of birth as the 
genesis or formation of the human form understood in both visual and morphological 
senses” (Mutman and Ocak, 2008, p. 25).47 All the parties in the debate unfold the 
ultrasound fetal image by reading it as a visual text at the moment of recognition of 
the form on the monitor. In this recognition, the fetal form is identified necessarily by 
a separation from its site and becomes an autonomous image/text. “The separateness 
and autonomy of, what we shall call for the sake of a better expression, the 
“originary human form” is achieved by giving it a shape or Gestalt” (Mutman and 
Ocak, 2008, p. 25). 
 
The ultrasound system of graphic visual representation creates a privileged focus that 
separates the fetus from the body of the pregnant woman and reduces it to a frame or 
environment. By calling the uterus an “envelope”, maybe Luce Irigaray wants to 
draw our attention to its protective role (Irigaray, 1987, p. 122). This reduction is 
then the most important step on the way to the notion of “fetal personhood.” On the 
one hand, the anti-abortion movement proclaims that it is “the living unborn child”, 
“another human being indistinguishable from any of us” in the words of Dr. Bernard 
Nathanson48, the famous presenter of the popular anti-abortion video The Silent 
Scream (qtd. in Petchesky, 1987, p. 173). On the other, fetologists see in this image 
their primary patient and “the life before birth” they are supposed to take care of and 
govern. Therefore, the pregnant woman stands in a conflicting position as the other, 
                                                 
47 Liley tells the following anectode:  “I forget which psychiatrist or psychologist it was who, in 
categorizing the various medical specialties in terms of the psychologic traits of their practitioners, 
decided that the obstetricians were compensating for an ungratified childhood curiosity to know 
where babies come from. If that is true, then many ... today could be said to have handsomely 
overcompensated” (qtd. in Oakley, 1986, p. 155). 
48 Petchesky (1987) introduces Nathanson as follows: “Nathanson is in “real life” a practicing Ob-
Gyn, ex-abortionist, and well-known anti-abortion crusader” (p. 173). 
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secondary patient from the fetological point of view. From a technologically 
determinist perspective, it can be said that, with the identification of the ultrasound 
apparatus with the prenatal care in the obstetrical clinic, and hence having the ‘live’ 
moving images of the fetus, not only anti-abortion rhetoric is transformed “from a 
mainly religious-mystical to a medical/technological mode” but also fetology is 
legitimized as a new sub-discipline in medicine by being able put the fetus under 
surveillance and control the whole process through its image (Petchesky, 1987, p. 
172). But this perspective still does not sufficiently explain what we see in the 
ultrasound fetal image. 
 
In order to understand the formation of the originary human form, two important 
aspects in the obstetrical staging of ultrasound examination should be underlined. 
First of all, unlike any ordinary gynecological examination, the partner of the 
pregnant woman is mostly present in the fetal examination. This transforms the 
perception of the fetal image into a new family member.49 Secondly, the obstetrician 
directs all the staging. The obstetrician not only identifies the fetal form but also 
guides the pregnant woman and her partner in this identification process. The staging 
becomes a pedagogical process in which the pregnant woman and her partner learn 
to see the fetal form. It is also a process of rationalization: clinical information is 
supposed to facilitate their rational decision-making process in case of emergency.  
 
The affective aspect of the ultrasound fetal examination is important as well. We 
should realize the significance of the fascination and astonishment of the pregnant 
woman and her partner when they encounter the image of their future baby.  The 
                                                 
49 This sequence in staging triggers the desire of having the ultrasoundgraphic pictures, which will 
take their place in the baby photo album known as “baby’s first picture.” 
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fetal image is not an image of an organ or a tissue. Although ultrasound imaging can 
be applied specifically to an organ in fetal examination, the identification of a future 
“baby” is radically different in the sense that it is emotionally charged. This is 
actually a ghostly image, a kind of blur that can only be identified by the trained eye 
of the obstetrician. The obstetrician draws the contours of the fetal image and makes 
it to be perceived as a form or Gestalt. Of course, it gets an increasingly more 
distinct shape in time, but it always needs the guidance of the obstetrician. The 
obstetrician’s discourse is fundamental in the identification and perception of the 
image as a human form, or an “originary” human form. This unfolding of the image 
in time can be described as teleological, because from the beginning, there is the 
assumption of a final human form. In other words, an ideal form is already 
presupposed as the form of a healthy, normal baby. 
 
Hence visualization is fundamental. Further, ideality and visibility are 
indistinguishable from each other in the sense that the ideal is not simply medical but 
also aesthetic or formal. The obstetrician’s account has almost no reference to the 
woman’s body during the examination, and his/her exclusive focus is the fetus. The 
medical/disciplinary governance of the woman’s body, dietary and other instructions, 
is after the ultrasound examination is over.  
 
5.1. Fetus as an Ethico-Political Figure 
 
The obstetrical regime is at once medical, aesthetic and ethico-political. Its strategic 
operation is the production of the fetal image, which is constructed as “originary” 
human form. This image or originary form has a long history, as I have showed in 
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previous chapters. But the modern technology of the ultrasound gives it an entirely 
new function and status. Today, the representation of the fetus as a homunculus, a 
tiny miniature man can only be a parody. What we have now is a different figure in 
terms of its medical inscription as well as its moral and political force and value. 
 
The fetal image has been idealized, has been made “live”, and hence has had a 
personhood since the first fetal photographs of Nilsson. Nilsson erected the fetal 
image by utilizing dead fetuses in his studio and presented them alive in a standing, 
upright position inside the amniotic sac. The background was darkened and was 
made to look like space in which the fetus appeared as “an astronaut.” While the 
female body is completely erased in his photographs, he produced the image of the 
standing fetus as a small human, as a distinct and viable life form. In his1965 photo-
essay in Life magazine, he totally narrativized these images in terms of a notion of 
fetal person. Later, with the advance of fiber optic technology he started to produce 
fetoscopic photographs and published his famous book, A Child is Born. This time, 
the photographs were inconceivable without captions. While the fetoscopic 
photographs were given more literal explanations, these medico-technological 
figures legitimized not only the disciplinary power/knowledge of obstetrics but also 
fetology. Nilsson’s fetal photography helped to create a whole theatrics, a system of 
dramatic representation, and this staging of the ultrasound created a public 
perception and discourse of “life before birth.” This powerful rhetoric can be 
described as the best expression of a medico-political fantasy, which extends the 
biopolitical logic over new territories such as the new fetal territory as well as the 
inside of the womb.  
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The ultrasound is the major agent in the production of this medico-political fantasy.  
On a medical level, fetology has developed a number of new medical practices from 
fetal surgery to fetal psychoanalysis (if fetal behavior is observed on a level 
sufficient to make psychoanalytic judgment). On the cultural and social level, the 
fetal images are now part of the individual photo album. Under the pressure of this 
emergent figure, now the systems of medical as well as cultural classification are 
also rapidly changing. But this change involves a blurring of categories. In a very 
interesting recent work, Nicole Isaacson (1996) draws our attention to the new 
strange category of the “fetus-infant.”50 This medico-political fantasy is based on the 
production of the fetus as an “originary” human form. In the case Isaacson discusses, 
the fetus-infant is treated as a member of the family not only by the family but also 
the whole neighborhood.  
 
The ultimate political instance of the displacement of the originary human form from 
the medical to social context is the anti-abortionist campaign in the U.S.A., in the 
mid-1980s, which became very well-known by its propaganda film The Silent 
Scream. In this film, the physician Bernard Nathanson begins his narration with a 
significant reference to fetology. The film involves a number of visual and discursive 
distortions of medical knowledge as well as fetal imagery, as a number of medical 
experts have exposed (Petchesky, 1987, p. 174).51 If we remember that the fetal 
                                                 
50 Isaacson offers a careful reading of obstetrical literature and elaborates the concept of the ”fetus-
infant” in this literature.  
51 Here, I will return again to Nicole Isaacson’s work on the new ambigious category of the “fetus-
infant”. She refers to the amazing case of “Olivia”. Following the finding of a heart defect in the fetus 
in a routine aultrasound, the parents realized that it is nearly impossible to find an appropriate donor 
after the birth. They decided to name the fetus “Olivia”and treat her as a child. Moreoever, the 
community accepted Olivia as a child and asked the mother how she was doing that particular day, 
etc. (Isaacson, 1996, pp. 457-477). Isaacson succinctly argues that the fetus-infant is an entirely new 
medical category which blurs the distinction between before and after, fetus and child, etc. What is at 
stake here is the production of an originary human form as well as the fantasy of access to the 
“before” of the subject. 
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image is a visual construction in the obstetrical clinic, then there is nothing 
unexpected in this further visual and verbal manipulation. The anti-abortionist 
concept of “life” is a visual form or figure which is in fact an artifact or installation. 
In addition to medical experts, the women’s and pro-choice movements have also 
shown that the anti-abortionist use of the images of fetus depends on visual and 
verbal manipulation. It is possible and perhaps imperative to defend a true medical 
image against the abuses and manipulations of the anti-abortionists. However it is 
also to be kept in mind that, without the medical production of originary human form 
by the ultrasound, the anti-abortionist movement would be deprived of a significant 
reference. It is more important to underline that the anti-abortionist concept of “right 
to life” depends on a very specific problematic of life. This is a problematic that sees 
life as development and ultimate fixing of a visible form. The ultrasound itself must 
be seen as a manifestation of the deeper and more systematic biopolitics, or at least, 
as that which motivates its invention: the desire to see the event of birth, the 
origination of the human form.  
 
Nilsson’s fetal images are specifically made to look upright. These images are in a 
way directly phallomorphic. Interestingly, the ultrasound fetal imaging cannot 
produce this upright form. As the fetus continuously changes its position and posture 
in the womb and as it grows and mutates, its ghostly, blurred shape is always in 
motion and the ultrasound imaging cannot provide a clear form. The structural and 
systematic need for expert account and explanation as well as simple visual guidance 
demonstrates that the alterity of the fetal image is irreducible. The continuous and 
irreducible alterity of the fetal image produces an uncanny shape that must be made 
sense of and governed by the medical apparatus. It keeps sending signs of life that 
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must be interpreted. These signs and forms however are interpreted in a binary 
system of representation, which operates by dualisms of mind vs. body, idea vs. 
matter, representation vs. real, man vs. woman, and so on.  
 
The production of this binary grid depends on the freezing and fixing of the 
differential movement of force in a visual form. In transforming the echoes into 
pixels which then form images, the ultrasound fixes and measures the differential 
force field of the body in order to be able to know and govern it. But does this mean 
that the body is merely an “object” of scientific representation? Jose van Dijck 
(2005) makes an interesting observation on the consequence of the use of medical 
technologies: although these technologies render the body transparent, the result is 
not simply an increase in our knowledge, but also the emergence of new unknown 
aspects about the body. According to her, “the mediated body is everything but 
transparent; it is precisely this complexity and stratification that makes it a contested 
cultural object” (Van Dijck, 2005, p. 4). How can we think of a body that is always 
already plural and changing? As a differential force field the body is not a static 
object placed before a knowing subject. The body is always in excess of itself, 
transgresses its boundaries and transforms itself that is it can no longer be taken as an 
ultimately stable form. The concept of body cannot be taken as only one side of a 
binary opposition, as the opposite of the mind. Instead it must be seen as involving 
mind and technology itself as its parts and extensions by which it knows and figures 
itself. It can then be seen as constantly transforming and complexifying itself. When 
the body is conceived in this way, the experience of ultrasound is no longer simply a 
power exercise, but it now reveals a different body in process.  
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5.2. Towards a Culture of the Two 
 
The theoretical frameworks of Foucault and Irigaray, which I used in a 
complementary way, reveal the complexity of the obstetrical ultrasound examination 
and body in process. Foucault’s bio-politics is at work in this imaging process but it 
is not limited solely to an exercise of power. His theoretical arguments also involve 
the reconstruction of the body not only through the medical gaze but the production 
of knowledge of the body through medical discourses and practices as well. Here, an 
articulation of Foucault’s concepts with Irigaray’s is necessary and essential in order 
to constitute a more elaborate theoretical framework to reveal the complexity of the 
obstetrical ultrasound imaging and the body in process.  
 
Irigaray’s argument already implies the theoretical and practical limits of Foucault’s 
concepts. Foucault’s bio-politics lacks in two points. First, Foucault only takes into 
consideration the body as a singular object. Although he attempts to include the 
difference between two sexes, Foucault’s arguments are stuck in the phallomorphic 
sameness of the culture of “oneness”, i.e., the phallocratic culture of patriarchal 
world. His argument can actually be taken as an indication of the patriarchal nature 
of the object he investigates. Secondly, Foucault makes his bio-political analyses 
through the production of medical knowledge, technology, its spatial organization, 
and hence the teleology of the medicalization of the body. In a sense, he indirectly 
shows the phallocratic practice of medicine in its discursive operations. But these 
discursive operations are still within the phallomorphic limits of language and 
phallocratic limits of Western metaphysical establishment. The critical perspective 
must be re-iterated here in order to develop a new perspective. I find this further 
critical aspect in Irigaray’s project. Here, I have to underline that, Foucault produces 
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a theoretical framework which enables us to articulate it with Irigaray’s project and 
produce a new form of analysis.  
 
Irigaray insists on staying within the phallomorphic language of the one and 
phallocratic metaphysical establishment in order to project a vulvomorphic symbolic 
order and thinking. This is a homeopathic position. The plurality of the second sex in 
her sexuality, language and imaginary can be unconcealed only by staying in this 
homeopathic position. And this attitude can take us to a different medical, ethical, 
and politico-aesthetical position in which we can develop new ways of seeing and 
understanding the obstetrical ultrasound imaging and the body in process in their 
complexity. Instead of one and same, we can see, think and understand the 
obstetrical imaging process and the representational operations on the female body 
and the fetus as the unfolding a multiple body, which is always at least “two”. 
 
This is the most obvious question, which gets never asked: Are there not indeed two 
bodies, i.e. the woman and the fetus? Luce Irigaray suggests that the woman’s body 
can actually be seen as a model for a culture of the two against the phallocratic 
culture of the One. While the latter is a form of culture in which the binary system 
serves to establish the hegemony of the One, the female body, especially the female 
procreative power, implies the possibility of thinking and living the two in a non-
binary, non-hierarchical way.  
 
I will take as my guide her short interview with the biologist Helene Rouch: “On the 
Maternal Order.” Irigaray is interested in Rouch’s fascinating research on the role of 
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placenta. According to Rouch, although placenta is a tissue formed by the embryo, it 
behaves like an organ that is practically independent of it.    
 
The embryo is half-foreign to the maternal organism. Indeed, half of its 
antigens are paternal in origin. Because of these, the mother should 
activate her defense mechanisms to reject this other to her self. The 
placenta, which is also this other, prevents this mechanism from being 
activated. In a complex manner, it will block or at the very least greatly 
minimize maternal activity leading to rejection, but only locally, around 
the uterus, and moreover in such a way that the mother keeps her 
defensive capacities against potential infection (Irigaray, 1993, p. 40). 
 
The placenta operates as an intermediate between the woman’s body and the fetus. It 
is both an interval and the element filling the gap between two. It regulates the blood 
circulation and exchanges between the two organisms by reallocating maternal 
substances for the benefit of both. When the woman body (as the self) recognizes the 
embryo as the other and activates her defense, placenta operates as a negotiator 
between the two bodies. Hence the woman’s body neither shows an aggression to the 
fetus as the other nor creates a fusion with it. The two can live together without 
fusion or aggression.  
 
Although the placenta plays such an essential role, it is seen as merely an appendage 
or excess. In fact, according to Rouch, the hegemonic culture is not innocent in this: 
most of the time, the placenta is kept by the hospitals and clinics in order to sell it to 
the cosmetics industry, for it is an immensely nutritious organism. Rouch insists that 
the placenta belongs to the woman’s body, and it should remain in her possession 
legally. From Irigaray’s point of view, her research shows the significance of the 
female body and subjectivity as model for a new, more democratic and plural 
culture. Rouch’s emphasis on the role of placenta expresses a different problematic 
of life than that of the hegemonic fetal culture and obstetrical regime. Life is no 
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longer seen in terms of a visible form or Gestalt, which introduces a hierarchical 
opposition of figure and ground. The woman’s body is no longer merely the frame or 
ground of a visible form. Woman’s body is a singular organism, a unique life form, 
which enables another one to live on equal terms with and within it. In this approach, 
the female body/woman is an active organism or life form with its own singular 
order and forces. This model should also have significant implications for 
morphology as the medical and biological science of form. It implies that the form is 
not merely a visualizable object of representation but in fact a relational process, 
which is plural and ever-changing. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that my 
research suggests a radical transformation of the way we conceive and organize our 
medical and aesthetic cultures and knowledges.  
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